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v

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.

:

Case No. 960445-CA

:

ROBERT FRIIS,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a conviction for custodial interference,
a third degree felony, in the Fifth Judicial District Court, Iron
County, the Honorable J. Philip Eves presiding.

This Court has

jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (Supp. 1997) .
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL and STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

By making an unsworn comment to counsel outside the jury' s

presence, did the judge give "testimony" in violation of rule 605,
Utah Rules of Evidence?
Because this issue was not raised below, the plain error standard
applies.

To establish plain error, an appellant must demonstrate

three elements: (i) An error occurred; (ii) the error was obvious;
and (iii) the error was harmful. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208
(Utah 1993) . If any one of these elements is missing, there is no
plain error. Id. at 1209.

2.

Has defendant adequately briefed his judicial notice claim

where he cites no statute, case, or rule of evidence?
This issue does not require this Court to review any action of
the trial court. Accordingly, no standard of review applies.
3.

Was the State required to prove facts of which the trial

court took judicial notice?
To the extent this issues restates issue No. 2, see issue No.,
2 above.
To the extent this issue presents a sufficiency claim, this Court
will "review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably
be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the
jury. [It will] reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence
only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which
he was convicted."

State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)

(citations omitted) ; accord State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah
1994) .
4.

Are defendant' s claims based on insufficiency of evidence,

premature charging, and jurisdiction properly before this Court?
This issue does not require this Court to review any action of
the trial court. Accordingly, no standard of review applies.
4a. Must a foreign custody award be domesticated in the State
of Utah in order to support a charge of custodial interference?
2

"The appropriate standard of review for a trial court's
interpretation of statutory law is correction of error." State v.
Adams, 830 P.2d 310, 313 (UtahApp.) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992).
5.

Has defendant preserved and adequately briefed his claim

that the statutory subsection making custodial interference a felony
if the child is ''removed and taken from one state to another" does
not apply to non-residents of Utah?
This issue does not require this Court to review any action of
the trial court.
6.

Accordingly, no standard of review applies.

Has defendant adequately briefed his double jeopardy claim?

This issue does not require this Court to review any action of
the trial court.

Accordingly, no standard of review applies.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
This appeal involves the following provisions, set out in addendum
A:
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

Code
Code
Code
Code

Ann.
Ann.
Ann.
Ann.

§
§
§
§

76-1-403
76-5-303
78-22a-l
78-45c-l

(1995);
(1995);
through -8; and
through -26.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by Amended Information dated 19 January
1996 with custodial interference, a third degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-303 (1995) (R. 176-77).

3

A jury found defendant guilty as charged, after which he received
a suspended sentence and was placed on probation (R. 331-35).

He

timely appealed (R. 336).
STATEMENT OF FACTS1
In 1987, defendant married Linda Friis (now Linda Pace); their
only child, Denim, was born in 1991 (R. 720-22) . Before the couple
separated, defendant repeatedly threatened that if Linda ever divorced
him, he would take Denim and go to Mexico (R. 739, 741) . Defendant
had a pilot's license, a passport, and friends living in Mexico (R.
737-39).
The couple was divorced on 8 May 1995 (R. 803) .

Defendant was

awarded six weeks of summer visitation with Denim during the summer
of 1995 (R. 803-04).

Linda was awarded one weekend visit after the

third week of this six-week period (R. 804).2

1

Except as otherwise noted, this brief recites facts from
the record in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict.
State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201# 1205-06 (Utah 1993); State v.
Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 1989).
2

At trial, the parties stipulated to these custody terms in
order to avoid confusing the jury with conflicting court
documents. Although the Stipulation filed in the Superior Court
of California did provide for defendant to have six weeks of
visitation at the beginning of the summer, the Default Judgment
did not incorporate this term. Compare State's exhibit 1 with
State's exhibit 2 (these exhibits were not received into evidence
[R. 895]). In reliance on the Default Judgment, Linda believed
that defendant was entitled to only one week's visitation in June
1995 (see R. 726-29, 805).
The judgment was entered by default because the court had
earlier stricken defendant's pleadings based on his having "acted
in a manner of exceedingly bad faith with this Court" (Exhibit P1, R. 287-88).
4

Defendant had a history of serious problems conforming to the
court-ordered visitation schedule (R. 810-11) . Visitation exchanges
took place in the Parowan police station under the supervision of
Officer Preston Griffiths (R. 654-56).
Linda was concerned that she did not have an address for
defendant; he had moved out of their old house and she had no way
of knowing where he resided (R. 730). Linda told Griffiths that
defendant "had pretty much ended up with, with nothing" in the divorce
and that "she was afraid that . . • [defendant] would take Denim
and something would happen" (R. 675).
At Linda's request, Officer Griffiths asked defendant for his
address and telephone number when he came for Denim on 10 June 1995
(R. 656-57, 882) . Defendant said that he was waiting for a telephone
line to be installed and would call Officer Griffiths the following
Tuesday and give him the number (R. 657, 883) . Defendant also gave
Officer Griffiths a Riverside address (R. 656). Defendant told the
officer that he was taking Denim for six weeks (R. 672-73).
However, it was customary for defendant to have custody of Denim
for only one week per month (R. 724) . In keeping with this custom,
and based on her reading of the Default Judgment, Linda assumed that
on 10 June 1995, defendant would be taking Denim for one week (R.
726, 729, 805).
Ten days later, Linda spoke to the Parowan police; she was
concerned because Denim had not been returned and because the address
5

defendant had given was fictitious (R. 658-59, 698, 733) . Nor had
defendant called the police with his new phone number as promised
(R. 658, 662-63).

Defendant did not grant Linda a weekend visit

after three weeks as required by the divorce documents, and six weeks
later, he still had not returned Denim (R. 805-06).
On 25 July 1995, six weeks and three days after defendant picked
up Denim, Linda hired Mark Swagger of Northwest Investigations, a
private investigation firm, to find Denim (R. 735, 807, 836, 840) .
One week later, Swagger talked to an associate of defendant's who
was able to page defendant and a meeting was set up in a restaurant
in Alta Loma, California (R. 841-42).
Defendant, who appeared "semi-agitated," told Swagger that he
had Denim (R. 842). He also told Swagger that "he knew somebody
would be looking for him because he had the child too long" (R. 845,
861) • Defendant also claimed that "he thought he had him like six
weeks" (R. 871). Defendant agreed to drop Denim off at the Ontario
airport on the following Sunday, 6 August (R. 845-46).
However, defendant did not drop off Denim at the airport as
promised (R. 692-93, 735-37, 847).3 Accordingly, Swagger instructed
his agents to "keep constant pressure on [defendant], his friends,
his family, anybody that he associated with until we could come up
with him or Denim" (R. 851) . Based on his experience in trying to

3

Linda and her investigators spent over six hours in the
airport waiting for defendant (R. 692-93, 735, 846-47).
6

locate thousands of persons, Swagger concluded that defendant "was
actively fleeing or trying to evade us" (R. 852-53, 860) .
In a conversation during this time, defendant told one of the
investigators that "he was told not to release the child by his
attorney" (R. 873) . However, when Swagger contacted him, the attorney
said that he had not been retained by defendant (R. 874).
Defendant eventually contacted one of Swagger's investigators
and asked, "Why are you messing with my family and friends?" (R.
682-85) . Another meeting was set up and, on 20 August 1995, Denim
was returned by three women at the Ontario airport (R. 693-97, 853) .
Defendant had kept Denim from 10 June 1995 to 20 August 1995,
a period of approximately ten weeks (R. 806).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. Judge's "testimony." The judge's unsworn comment to counsel
outside

the

jury's presence

did not

constitute

"testimony."

Accordingly, it did not violate rule 605, Utah Rules of Evidence.
2.

Judicial notice.

inadequately briefed.

Defendant's judicial notice claim is

He cites no statute, no case, and no rule

of evidence to support it. It is therefore not properly before this
Court.
3.

Sufficiency.

Defendant claims that the State presented

no evidence that the Superior Court of California is a court of
competent jurisdiction.

To the extent that this point reiterates

defendant's attack on judicial notice in point II, it fails for reasons
7

explained in the State's point II. To the extent defendant's point
III raises an insufficiency claim, it fails for non-compliance with
the marshaling requirement.
4. Inadequately briefed claims. Defendant's claims based on
insufficiency of evidence, premature charging, California residency,
and jurisdiction—all raised in his point IV—are inadequately briefed
and so not properly before this Court.
4.a. Domestication of foreign custody award. Defendant claims
that he cannot be prosecuted for custodial interference because his
visitation rights were governed by a foreign custody award that was
never domesticated in Utah pursuant to the Foreign Judgments Act
and the Utah Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA).

This claim

is preserved and adequately briefed.
It fails, however, because (1) the custodial interference statute
does not require a domesticated or even a "valid" award, only that
the award be issued by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2)
conversely, nothing in the Foreign Judgments Act or the UCCJA suggests
that they were intended to apply in this context;(3) prosecuting
defendant for custodial interference does not constitute "enforcement"
of the underlying custody award; (4) defendant's interpretation of
the Utah statutes runs afoul of the federal Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act; (5) Utah courts have never required domestication
of a foreign judgment in order to predicate criminal liability upon
it; and (6) requiring domestication here would lead to absurd results.
8

5.

Crossing state lines.

Defendant's claim that he should

not be criminally liable for having removed the child "from one state
to another" because he is a resident of California was not preserved
at trial and is not adequately briefed on appeal. It therefore fails.
6.

Double jeopardy.

Defendant's double jeopardy claim is

inadequately briefed. His brief fails to address the pivotal legal
question and cites no relevant authority.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JUDGE' S UNSWORN COMMENT TO COUNSEL OUTSIDE THE JURY' S
PRESENCE DID NOT CONSTITUTE "TESTIMONY"
In point I of his brief, defendant claims that the trial judge
erred when he "testified" about the courts of the State of California.
Br. Aplt. at 11.
Proceedings below. Utah Code Ann. §76-5-303(1) (1995) defines
custodial interference, as charged in this case, as follows:
(1) A person, whether a parent or other, is guilty
of custodial interference if, without good cause, the actor
takes, entices, conceals, or detains a child under the
age of 16 from its parent, guardian, or other lawful
custodian:
(a) knowing the actor has no legal right to do so;
and
(b) with intent to hold the child for a period
substantially longer than the visitation or custody period
previously awarded by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Thus, the State was required to establish at trial that Denim's custody
award was issued by a "court of competent jurisdiction."
9

Although

defendant relied on this very award as justification for his actions
(see, e.g..

R. 667-68, 823-24, 871), he consistently refused to

stipulate to an "element of the offense" (R. 799-800).
At the close of the State's case, the prosecutor asked the court
to instruct the jury as a matter of law that the Superior Court of
California is a court of competent jurisdiction (R. 887).

The

prosecutor pointed out that the parties had already stipulated that
the signing judge was a judge of the Superior Court, that the judge
issued a Default Judgment establishing custody and visitation, that
defendant and Linda were named in the pleadings, that the parties
had testified about the pleadings, and that the trial court had before
it exemplified copies of the stipulation and judgment entered by
the California court (R. 892-93) . Defendant argued that "[t]he Court
has not been supplied with the necessary information to take judicial
notice" (R. 889).
The judge stated that, in addition, the structure of the
California court system was "generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of . . . this Court" (R. 893) . Furthermore, the judge
had himself practiced law in California for five years before moving
to Utah and was "well aware of the fact that the California Superior
Court is analogous to the Utah District Court and . . . is charged
with handling domestic matters, divorce matters" (R. 894). "And,"
he continued, "I think it's capable of easy determination whether
the California Superior Court is the court that would handle a domestic*
10

matter in that State" (R. 894) . The court also noted that evidence
had been admitted that defendant and Linda were living in San
Bernardino County at the time of the divorce, and that defendant
had chosen that jurisdiction in which to file his divorce (R. 894) .
The trial court ruled that the foregoing facts were a sufficient
basis to take judicial notice that the California Superior Court
has jurisdiction over divorce proceedings (R. 894; see also R. 270) .4
Analysis.

The linchpin of defendant's argument is that the

trial judge "testified" by informing counsel of his knowledge of
the California court system. This "testimony," he argues, violated

4

Although the court did not specify this purpose for its
action, judicially noticing this fact had the effect of keeping
from the jury evidence of defendant's dishonesty.
Requiring the
State to introduce evidence of the competency of the California
court would have necessitated introduction of an exemplified copy
of the Default Judgment (see R. 7 98).
Defendant's objection to the introduction of this document
had earlier been sustained (see R. 750-61, 785-86). Defendant's
motion was based on the fact that the California judgment recited
the bad faith actions of defendant, including his fraudulent
transfer of a Cessna airplane, his intentional and deliberate
disobedience to the orders of the court, his deliberate and
intentional dissipation of community assets "for the explicit
purpose of defrauding the community," his removal of numerous
boats to Arizona "in order to avoid the Jurisdiction of [the
California] Court," and the sale of assets "in contravention of
the Court Order and in a direct contradiction of" his prior
testimony (Exhibit P-l, R. 288-91). As a result of defendant's
having "acted in a manner of exceedingly bad faith with [the
California] Court," that court struck his pleadings and entered
the default judgment (Exhibit P-l, R. 287-88).
Had the Utah District Court not taken judicial notice of the
jurisdictional competency of the Superior Court of California,
this document would have had to be introduced. Thus, the trial
court's action obviated the need to introduce this arguably
inflammatory document.
11

rule 605, Utah Rules of Evidence, which provides: "The judge presiding
at the trial may not testify in that trial as a witness. No objection
need be made in order to preserve the point.'7 See Br. Aplt. at 12.
The judge's statement was not testimony. It was not made under
oath nor before the jury (see R. 887) . Defendant cites no authority
supporting his assumption that a judge's statement to counsel outside
the presence of the jury is "testimony."

See Br. Aplt. at 11-13.

On the contrary, "testimony" by definition is given "under oath
or affirmation." Black's Law Dictionary 1476 (6th ed. 1990).

Because

the judge's statement was not "testimony," it did not violate rule
605 and, consequently, defendant's first point lacks merit.
POINT II
DEFENDANT' S JUDICIAL NOTICE CLAIM IS INADEQUATELY BRIEFED
AND THEREFORE NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT
Defendant claims that the trial court erred by judicially noticing
an element of the offense, to wit, that the custody award here was
issued by a court of competent jurisdiction.

Br. Aplt. at 13.5

Rule 24 (a) (9) , Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires that
the argument portion of appellant's brief "shall contain the
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues
presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved
5

Defendant's brief contains no citation to the record
showing that this claim was preserved in the trial court or any
statement of grounds for seeking review of an unpreserved issue.
See Br. of Aplt- at 2. Consequently, the brief violates rule
24(a)(5), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The claim was,
however, arguably preserved below (see R. 889).
12

in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes,
and parts of the record relied on."'

(Emphasis added.)

Under this rule, Utah appellate courts decline to consider
arguments that are not adequately supported by authority and analysis.
See, e.g.. State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989); State
v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984); State v. Farrow, 919
P.2d 50, 53 n.l (Utah App. 1996); State v. Streeter, 900 P.2d 1097,
1100 n.3 (Utah App. 1995), cert, denied, 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996);
State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 569 n.3 (Utah App. 1994); State
v. Mincv, 838 P.2d 648, 652 n.2 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Price,
827 P.2d 247, 248-50 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Dav, 815 P.2d 1345,
1351 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Caver, 814 P.2d 604, 613 (Utah App.
1991); State v. Steroer, 808 P.2d 122, 125 n.2 (Utah App. 1991);
State v. Pascoe, 774 P.2d 512, 514 n.l (Utah App. 1989).
This Court should decline to consider point II of defendant's
brief because he has failed to comply with rule 24 (a) (9) . Defendant
cites no statute, no case, and no rule of evidence. See Br. Aplt.
at 13-15.

The only legal authority he cites is rule 4-504, Utah

Rules of Judicial Administration, which requires the submission of
proposed orders to opposing counsel for approval as to form, a point
not at issue in this case.

See Br. Aplt. at 15.

Under the authorities cited above, this Court should decline
to reach defendant's claim that the trial court erroneously took

13

judicial notice that the California Superior Court has jurisdiction
over divorce proceedings (R. 894).6
POINT III
THE STATE WAS NOT REQUIRED AT TRIAL TO PROVE FACTS OF WHICH
THE TRIAL COURT HAD TAKEN JUDICIAL NOTICE
Defendant claims that the evidence of his guilt was insufficient
because the State "never presented any evidence" that the California
Superior Court was a court of competent jurisdiction.

Br. Aplt.

at 15-16.
Of course, the trial court judicially noticed that the California
court had jurisdiction over domestic matters, thereby obviating the
need for proof on this point. See State v. Lawrence, 234 P.2d 600,
601 (Utah 1951) ("Judicial notice is the taking cognizance by the
court of certain facts without the necessity of proof").
To the extent that defendant's point III reiterates his attack
on the trial court's having taken judicial notice, it fails for reasons
stated in point II herein (complete lack of supporting authority).

6

All evidence introduced at trial supported the court's
ruling in any event. Defendant's theory that he was entitled to
six weeks of visitation necessarily assumed the legitimacy of the
stipulation entered by the California Superior Court (see, e.g.,
R. 871-72). On appeal he continues to argue that his visitation
was "regular and authorized" and that he was merely "engaged in
court ordered activities." Br. Aplt. at 16. At trial, no
evidence or representations of counsel raised the least doubt
that the California award constituted a custody award "by a court
of competent jurisdiction." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-303 (1) (b)
(1990).
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To the extent that defendant's point III raises an insufficiency
claim, his one-page discussion of this issue fails to satisfy or
even to acknowledge his obligation to marshal the evidence in support
of the jury verdict. "A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
presents the defendant with a heavy burden. He must first marshal
all the evidence supporting the jury's verdict and then demonstrate
how this evidence, even viewed in the most favorable light, is
insufficient to support the verdict."

State v. Strain, 885 P.2d

252, 819 (Utah App. 1994) (citations omitted); accord West Vallev
Citv v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App. 1991).
Even if the trial court had not judicially noticed the
jurisdiction of the California Superior Court, the record contains
evidence from which a jury could reasonably have inferred this fact.
Defendant acknowledges none of this evidence, see Br. Aplt. at 15-16,
even though his own theory of the case relied on the validity of
the California custody award.

On appeal, defendant continues to

assert that his conduct "was no violation of the law" because he
acted "pursuant to that court order."

Br. Aplt. at 16.

Finally, defendant has not complied with the briefing requirements
of rule 24(a) (9).

See authorities cited in point II above. Other

than quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (presumption of innocence),
he cites no authority.

See Br. Aplt. at 15-16.

In addition,

defendant's point III contains no analysis of the interplay between
judicial notice and sufficiency that underlies his argument.
15

Based on the authorities cited in point II of this brief,
defendant's point III fails for inadequate briefing and failure to
marshal.
POINT IV
DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS BASED ON INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE,
PREMATURE CHARGING, AND JURISDICTION ARE INADEQUATELY
BRIEFED
Point IV of defendant's brief asserts a cluster of related claims
based on insufficiency of evidence, premature charging, California
residency, jurisdiction, and the foreign nature of the custody award.
All but the last, which will be treated separately in point IV-A
herein, are inadequately briefed on appeal.
Authorized visitation. Defendant cla ims that the State "use [d]
the regular and authorized exercise of visitation to meet an element
of the offense." Br. Aplt. at 16 (capitalization omitted) . He argues
that when he picked up his son "he was doing so pursuant to the
stipulation between the parties that was entered into in California."
Id.
The issue at trial and under the statute was not whether defendant
was acting pursuant to a court order.

Indeed, one element of the

crime is that the perpetrator "hold the child for a period
substantially longer than the visitation or custody period previously
awarded."

§ 76-5-303(1)(b).

This language presupposes that the

perpetrator's custody is initially authorized.
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See

1 imer

I In..' S t a t ; e

vacation.

(R. at 901)." Br. Aplt. at 19. Defendant's record cite

is to his own argument below. Given that rearguing favorable evidence
does not satisfy appellant's burden to marshal, see York v. Shulsen,
875 P.2d 590, 598 (Utah App. 1994), a fortiori citation to one's
own argument below does not.
Other claims.

Point IV of defendant's brief may be read to

assert other claims: that his conviction should be reversed because
an information and arrest warrant were issued prematurely, see Br.
Aplt. at 17; that, as a California resident, he cannot be guilty
of having "removed [Denim] and taken [him] from one state to another,"
section 76-5-303(3) , Br. Aplt. at 18; and that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction because "[t]here was no offense at all especially that
was committed in the State of Utah." Id.
Under the authorities cited in point II herein, all such claims
fail because they are unsupported by any legal authority or analysis.
See Br. Aplt. at 17-18.

" y [A] reviewing court is entitled to have

the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is
not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the
burden of argument and research.'" State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 120,
130 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450
(Utah 1988) (citation omitted)).
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POINT IV-A
A FOREIGN CUSTODY AWARD NEED NOT BE REGISTERED IN THE STATE
OF UTAH IN ORDER TO SUPPORT A CHARGE OF CUSTODIAL
INTERFERENCE
3n th" Id Mi-1 | M11 Li MI i ni

• ' "", IIHI iM'nlanl ' s brief argues

that defendant cannot be guilty

: : :erference with custody based

ci. ii "' "a I i f orni ,"i ,u|,ii nly riw.i rd tridt wds never registered in rM* ,sU
See Br , Ap 11 ...it 19 - 2 i ,"

Tins clai™ i ? preserved and adequa;..-.. /

briefed.
Defendant reli o c ^n two s . jt**«.
Judgment Act. "* ••
19 -20

-^ ?-•

Tin

I

~ T8-22a-I through •- -

:

judgments entered >

.

the cu^rt-

*

* i <riH 1 j I MI 1 i I

after a J U - U G

filing

i in*- ^udgment +"o +-^

*?';-<-• ^ r-^iou, t^.c judgment

procedures, aifenses
*• * r reopen IPO

,-,:: jrcemen 4

1 .e

, :^:r^.':

r-:- ^ddress ^€

• /ri-^^d-ju,'

..' . e or

i

cne aisLiiCi c ; r t

together witn H affidavit s^a 1 ir^ •
. ,

'

~:-i states.
•

Br. Apir, ^-:

:s

:

the

The cc ;rt clerk mails
udgment debt-.

,

"subject to the same
I on, ..mid pi. oceedings

^ca i r\ ; ^ •• - r . . - : d-r

staying as a judgment
78-22a 2, - 3 .

8

The State has numbered this claim point IV-A in order to
devote an entire point to this claim while still somewhat
tracking defendant's numbering.
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The other statute on which defendant relies is the Utah Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-l
through -26. The primary purpose of the Act is to "avoid jurisdiction
competition and conflict with courts of other states in matters of
child custody."

See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-l(l)(a).

The UCCJA

establishes a procedure for filing foreign custody decrees in a Utah
district court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-15 (1) . Once the parties
are given notice and an opportunity to be heard, a "custody decree
so filed has the same effect and shall be enforced in like manner
as a custody decree rendered by a court of this state." Id. However,
"if the copy has not been filed, it shall not be considered a valid;
custody decree."

Id.

Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 (Utah App. 1992) considered
these two statutes in a civil custody dispute.

The case involved

an Ohio divorce decree which had been filed in Utah and an Ohio
modification order which had not.

Ici. at 159.

Under one order,

the mother was entitled to custody; under the other, the father was.
Id.

This Court held that "only the original divorce decree was

enforceable in Utah since only it had been filed here." .Id. at 164.
Defendant contends that Holm controls the case at bar.

See

Br. Aplt. at 22. Prosecuting him for custodial interference based
on

the

California

Default

Judgment,

he

argues,

"enforcement" of an undomesticated foreign judgment.
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• n i in 1 i M I IJII ilndgments A c t o r '

the UCCJA suggests that eithex w ^> intended to apply in the criminal
context

ThiH1"' U-.'Xl ""i 1,,1'ne I

to the criminal setting,

<

dgments A c t makes no reference
:**• ontrary, the A c t speaks in civil

laiqr in, speei .1 y i r\q IV i example tiiac the foreign judgment is to be

filed by the "judgment creditor or attorney for the creditor" and
notice served upon the "judgment debtor." Utah Code Ann. § 78-22a-3.
Similarly, the UCCJA makes no reference to criminal law. One
stated purpose of the Act is to "deter abductions and other unilateral
removals of children," but only those "undertaken to obtain custody
awards." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-l(a) (e) . There is no indication
that the abduction at issue here was undertaken for this purpose.
These statutes are limited to the civil context and Utah courts
have never required domestication of foreign judgments in the criminal
context. Hence, Holm, a civil enforcement action, does not control
the case at bar (see R. 784-85).
Third, prosecuting a defendant for custodial interference does
not constitute "enforcement" of the underlying custody award.
Defendant cites no authority to the contrary. See Br. Aplt. at 19-23.
Section 76-5-303(1) (b) provides that a person commits the crime of
custodial interference if he does certain specified acts "with intent
to hold the child for a period substantially longer than the visitation
or custody period previously awarded by a court of competent
jurisdiction." Thus, the finder of fact looks to the custody award
to determine the duration of the custody period, but does not "enforce"
it.

Indeed, the filing of a criminal action is not a recognized

means of enforcing a civil judgment. See generally 30 Am. Jur. 2d
Executions and Enforcement of Judgments (1994) .
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Fourth, if, on the other hand, prosecuting defendant for custodial
interference does constitute enforcement ol: t ne Lai ILOJ in i a iX'fauli.
Judgment, requiring .its domestication may run afoul of federal law,
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Holm does :ic_ address the PKPA.
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See id.
•.

Accord

*:

See 840 P.2d at 160-64.

case, proof of defendant's prior Colorado conviction was insufficient;
however, no mention of domestication requirement); see also In re
Smith, 925 P.2d 169, 171-73 (Utah 1996) (affirming lawyer' s disbarmentbased

on Wisconsin

convictions; no mention

of domestication

requirement).
Finally, this Court should decline defendant's invitation to
graft the filing requirements of the Foreign Judgments Act and the
UCCJA onto Utah's criminal custodial interference statute because
doing so would lead to absurd results. See Millett v. Clark Clinic,
609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980) ("interpretations are to be avoided
which render some part of a provision nonsensical or absurd").
Defendant's interpretation would require parents new to the state
or visiting here to register foreign custody awards 30 days prior
to entering Utah in order to claim protection of the custodial
interference statute.
The fact pattern of the case at bar also illustrates the mischief
that defendant's reading of the statutes would create.

Defendant

faults Linda Pace for not domesticating the California Default
Judgment. See Br. Aplt. at 23. However, in reality, under defendant's
reading of the statutes, protecting Denim from defendant's acts on
10 June 1995 was a practical impossibility.
Under the Foreign Judgments Act, "No execution or other process
for the enforcement of a foreign judgment filed under this chapter
may issue until 30 days after the judgment is filed [in a district
24

court of this state] " Utah Code Ann. § 78-22a-3
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jjy Utah precedent, w r by the equities of this case.
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Under the UCCJA, a foreign decree "shall not be
considered a valid custody decree" until it is filed in a
-.h
district court and all parties are given an opportunity tc
contest it, a process that could also consume 30 days
;-.
See Utah Code Ann § 78 -45c-15. .
• ' n Beginning the domestication process on 18 .Jnine 1995, au
defendant now suggests, see Br. Aplt. at 22, would not have cured
the defect he alleges, since the California Default Judgment
would not have been a "valid decree" on 10 June 1995, the date on
which the crime was committed (see R. 9 0 4 0 7 ) .
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POINT V
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE STATUTORY SUBSECTION MAKING
CUSTODIAL INTERFERENCE A FELONY IF THE CHILD IS "REMOVED
AND TAKEN FROM ONE STATE TO ANOTHER" DOES NOT APPLY TO
NON-RESIDENTS OF UTAH IS UNPRESERVED AND INADEQUATELY
BRIEFED
Under section 76-5-303(3)f custodial interference is a class
A misdemeanor "unless the child is removed and taken from one state
to another, in which case it is a felony of the third degree.'' It
is undisputed that defendant took Denim from Utah to California.
See Br. Aplt. at 24. However, defendant claims that he should not
have been charged with a felony because his "reason for transporting
his son out of this state was because he resides in the State of..
California." Br. Aplt. at 24. "At the very most," defendant argues,
he "should have only been charged with a misdemeanor." Id. at 25.
Charging him with a felony under section 76-5-303(3), he contends,
constituted a violation of "the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the U.S. Constitution as well as Article I, Sections 7, 24 [sic]
of the Utah State Constitution."
A.

Id.

This claim was not preserved below.

Defendant's brief contains no citation to the record showing
that this constitutional claim was preserved in the trial court or
any statement of grounds for seeking review of an unpreserved issue.
See Br. of Aplt. at 2. Consequently, the brief violates rule 24 (a) (5),
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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ion I'm. modification and receiving

a temporary restraining order," 620 P.2d at 513, The supreme court
held t:hal" 1 liese act .ions "v"do not fall within the purview" of section
76-5-303(1 )
Although defendant claims that he is asserting '"the same claim"
as in Nielsen, see Br. Aplt. a

.. ther Nielsen nor Smith mentions

section 76-5-303 (3) , the U.S. Constitution, the U'tah Constitution,
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or the distinction

between misdemeanor

and

felony

custodial

interference. In short, neither is relevant to this point. Defendant
cites no other statute, case, or rule of evidence in support of his
constitutional claims.

See Br. Aplt. at 23-26.

Although defendant claims that application of section 76-5-303(3)
to him violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution and article I, sections 7 and 24 of the Utah
Constitution, he does not quote or discuss the text of any of these
provisions or any precedents discussing them. See Br. Aplt. at 23-26.
Based on the authorities cited in point II of this brief,
defendant's insufficiency claim fails for inadequate briefing.
POINT VI
BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILS TO ADDRESS THE PROPRIETY OF THE
DISMISSAL OF HIS FIRST TRIAL IN LIGHT OF THE CONTROLLING
STATUTE, HIS DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAIM IS INADEQUATELY BRIEFED
After defendant's first trial ended in a mistrial, he was tried
again and convicted.

Defendant claims that this retrial violated

his state and federal double jeopardy rights. See Br. Aplt. at 26.Proceedings below. Defendants first trial began on 19 January
1996 (R. 429) . After the jury was sworn and impaneled, a juror ran
into defense counsel in the court parking lot and said to him, "What
are you doing driving a ragtop [convertible] down in country like
this or weather like this" (R. 544). Defense counsel responded,
"we can't talk" (R. 545). The juror replied, "Not even a little?"
or words to that effect, and added, "I like your boots anyhow" (R.
28

545).

Defense counsel "informed the Court of the contact so that

things [could] be dealt with appropt idU11. y"" IIR. '• h.i).
The State moved for a mistrial,, arguing for the importance of
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defendant would have a right to a mistrial under controlling case
law (R. 553-54) . jt further opined that the State a ] so had a right
to a fair trial with respect to juror contacts (P
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now?" (R. 554-55). Defense counsel responded, "I .think we need a
ruling now, Your Honor" (R. 555). The prosecutor agreed (R. 555) .
The court granted a mistrial and reduced bail from $100,000
cash to $15,000 cash or surety (R. 572, 578) .12 Trial was reset for
8 February 1996 (R. 580-84).
At the outset of the second trial, defendant moved to dismiss
on double jeopardy grounds (R. 607). He claimed prejudice in that
the State had added a witness to its witness list and had obtained
an exemplified copy of the California divorce judgment (R. 610-11) .
The court denied defendant's motion in reliance upon Utah Code
Ann. § 76-1-403(4) (c) (iii) (1995) (R. 630, 634). It found that the
juror's conversation with defense counsel made it "difficult or
impossible or . . . unadvisable to proceed with the trial because
there was a substantial danger that the State's right to a fair trial
would be prejudiced" (R. 632). The court also identified potential
prejudice to the defendant arising from the fact that defense counsel
"rebuffed the advance of the juror and basically walked away from
him" (R. 632). The court ruled although it "didn't use the magic
[statutory]

words

substantially

in

^impossible
compliance

to
with

proceed'"
[Utah

its

Code

"ruling

Ann.

§

was
7 6-1-

403(4)(c)(iii)]" (R. 632-33).
Analysis.

This issue is inadequately briefed by defendant.

12

Defendant was also being held on $5,000 bail pending
trial on assault by prisoner charges (R. 571).
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Absent a claim that constitutional guarantees differ from the
statute, double jeopardy issues in Utah are controlled by Utah Code
Ann. §76-1-403 (1995). See State v. Nilson, 854 P.2d 1029, 1031-32
(UtahApp. 1993). Subsection 76-1-403(1) forbids reprosecution of
a defendant if the former prosecution was "improperly terminated."
Termination is improper if it "takes place before the verdict, is
for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and takes place after
a jury has been impanelled [sic] and sworn to try the defendant,"
subject to certain exceptions. § 76-1-403(4) . One of the exceptions
is where " [p] rejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom not
attributable to the state makes it impossible to proceed with the
trial without injustice to the defendant or the state." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-1-403(4)(c)(iii).
It was on this ground that the trial court denied defendant's
motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy (R. 631-34) . Consequently,
the dispositive question on appeal is whether the juror contact made
it "impossible to proceed" with defendant's first trial "without
injustice to the defendant or the state." § 76-1-403(4) (c) (iii).
Cf. State v. Castle, No. 960755-CA, slip op. at 5-8 (UtahApp. January
2, 1998).
However, defendant's brief does not address this question.
It does not cite the controlling statutory language except insofar
as the extended excerpt from Nilson incidentally includes it. See
Br. Aplt. at 27. Defendant claims that Nilson "is precedent in this
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matter." See Br. Aplt. at 28. However, Nilson addresses subsection
403(4) (a); it says nothing about subsection 403(4) (c). See Nilson,
854 P.2d at 1032. It therefore sheds no light on the question before
this Court. Defendant's brief otherwise cites no authority except
article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution.

See Br. Aplt. at

26. Nor does the brief cite any precedents discussing when improper
juror contact warrants a mistrial.
P.2d 277, 279-80 (Utah 1985);

See, e.g.. State v. Pike, 712

State v. Tennev, 913 P.2d 750, 757

(Utah App. 1996); State v. Swain, 835 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Utah App.
1992) ; Loaan Citv v. Carlson, 799 P.2d 224, 225-26 (Utah App. 1990);
State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 908-09 (Utah App. 1990).
The following sentence constitutes defendant's entire discussion
of the termination of the first trial: "The prosecution failed to
inquire the nature of the conversation [sic] or adequately demonstrate
findings in which this Court could properly rule for a mistrial and
not attach Double Jeopardy [sic] ." Br. Aplt. at 28. Any implication
that the nature of the conversation was not adequately explored is
misleading, since defense counsel himself disclosed the entire
conversation to the Court (see R. 546).
Likewise, the claim that the trial court failed to make adequate
findings is puzzling in light of the following statement by the court:
"But I certainly made a finding that the State's right to a fair
trial was in jeopardy because of that contact. And I think that's,
that is tantamount to the finding required under 76-1-403. I didn't
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use the magic words ^impossible to proceed' but I think that my ruling
was substantially in compliance with that statute" (R. 632-33).
The court was correct. So long as "the record clearly reflects that
the mistrial was based on" the requirements of section 7 6-1403 (4) (c) (iii), any deficiency in the trial court's findings is
harmless.

See Castle, No. 960755-CA, slip op. at 6.

In short, defendant's brief contains no authority or analysis
relevant to the pivotal question of whether defendant's first trial
was improperly terminated.

Accordingly, based on the authorities

cited in point II of this brief, defendant's double jeopardy claim
fails for inadequate briefing.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted on ( Q January 1998.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

r. J FREDERIC VOROS, JR
assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

76-5-303. Custodial interference.
(1) A person, whether a parent or other, is guilty of custodial interference if,
without good cause, the actor takes, entices, conceals, or detains a child under
the age of 16fromits parent, guardian, or other lawful custodian:
(a) knowing the actor has no legal right to do so; and
(b) with intent to hold the child for a period substantially longer than
the visitation or custody period previously awarded by a court of competent jurisdiction.
(2) A person, whether a parent or other, is guilty of custodial interference if,
having actual physical custody of a child under the age of 16 pursuant to a
judicial award of any court of competent jurisdiction which grants to another
person visitation or custody rights, and without good cause the actor conceals
or detains the child with intent to deprive the other person of lawful visitation
or custody rights.
(3) Custodial interference is a class A misdemeanor unless the child is
removed and takenfromone state to another, in which case it is a felony of the
third degree.

GENERAL PROVISIONS

76-1-403

76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent prosecution for offense out of same episode.
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out
of a single criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a
different offense arising out of the same criminal episode is barred if:
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was or should have
been tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution; and
(b) The former prosecution:
(i) resulted in acquittal; or
(ii) resulted in conviction; or
(iii) was improperly terminated; or
(iv) was terminated by afinalorder or judgment for the defendant
that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that necessarily
required a determination inconsistent with a fact that must be
established to secure conviction in the subsequent prosecution.
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in afindingof not guilty
by the trier of facts or in a determination that there was insufficient evidence
to warrant conviction. Afindingof guilty of a lesser included offense is an
acquittal of the greater offense even though the conviction for the lesser
included offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or vacated.
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of guilt
that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty that has not
been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that is capable of supporting a
judgment; or a plea of guilty accepted by the court.
(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if the termination takes
place before the verdict, is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and takes
place after a jury has been impanelled and sworn to try the defendant, or, if the
jury trial is waived, after the first witness is sworn. However, termination of
prosecution is not improper if:
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; or
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to the termination;
(c) The court finds and states for the record that the termination is
necessary because:
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity
with the law; or
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not attributable to the
state that would make any judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of law; or
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom not attributable
to the state makes it impossible to proceed with the trial without
injustice to the defendant or the state; or
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent a fair trial.
History: C. 1953, 76-1-403, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196,1 76-1-403; 1974, ch. 32, 8 3.
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78-22-4. Mileage allowance for judgment debtor required
to appear.
Every judgment debtor legally required to appear before a circuit or district
court or a master to answer concerning his, her, or its property is entitled, on
a sufficient showing of need, to mileage of 15 cents per mile for each mile
actually and necessarily traveled in going only, to be paid by the judgment
creditor at whose instance the judgment debtor was required to appear, but
the judgment creditor is not required to make any payment for such mileage
until the judgment debtor has actually appeared before the court or master.
History: L. 1983, ch. 159, { 1.

CHAPTER 22a
FOREIGN JUDGMENT ACT
Section
78-22a-l.
78-22a-2.
78-22a-3.
78-22*4.

Short title.
Definition — Filing and status of
foreign judgments.
Notice of filing.
Stay.

Section
78-22a-5.
78-22a-6.
78-22a-7.
78-22a-8.

Lien.
Optional procedure.
Fees.
Uniformity of interpretation.

78-22a-l. Short title.
This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah Foreign Judgment Act."
History: C. 1953, 78-22a-l, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 169, f 1.

78-22a-2. Definition — Filing and status of foreign judgments.
(1) As used in this chapter, "foreign judgment" means any judgment, decree, or order of a court of the United States or of any other court whose acts
are entitled to full faith and credit in this state.
(2) A copy of a foreign judgment authenticated in accordance with an appropriate act of Congress or an appropriate act of Utah may befiledwith the
clerk of any district court in Utah. The clerk of the district court shall treat
the foreign judgment in all respects as a judgment of a district court of Utah.
(3) Aforeignjudgment filed under this chapter has the same effect and is
subject to the same procedures, defenses, enforcement, satisfaction, and proceedings for reopening, vacating, setting aside, or staying as a judgment of a
district court of this state.
History: C. 1953, 78-22a-2, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 169, § 1; 1991, ch. 169, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted
"clerk" for "county clerk" and "district court"

for "county* in the first sentence in Subsection
(2), added the Subsection (3) designation, inserted "foreign" before judgment" in Subsection (3), and made stylistic changes in Subsections (1) and (3).
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Dormant judgment.
Limitation of actions.
Setting aside foreign judgments.
Cited.
Dormant judgment
If a foreign judgment is filed in Utah and
subsequently becomes dormant in the state of
rendition, its enforceability in this state is not
affected. Pan Energy v. Martin, 813 P.2d 1142
(Utah 1991).
Limitation of actions.
At least for purposes of enforcement, the filing of a foreign judgment under Subsection (2)

creates a new Utah judgment which is governed by the Utah statute of limitations. Pan
Energy v. Martin, 813 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1991).
Setting aside foreign judgments.
Neither the Utah Foreign Judgment Act
(this chapter), nor Rule 60(b)(1), U.R.C.P., permits a court to set aside a foreign default judgment because of alleged inadvertence, mistake,
or neglect absent a showing offraudor the lack
of jurisdiction or due process in the rendering
state. Data Mgt. Sys. v. EDP Corp., 709 P.2d
377 (Utah 1985).
Cited in Bradford v. Nagle, 763 P.2d 791
(Utah 1988).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AXIL — Judgment subject to appeal as entitled to full faith and credit, 2 A.L.R.3d 1384.

78-22a-3, Notice of filing.
(1) The judgment creditor or attorney for the creditor, at the time offilinga
foreign judgment, shall file an affidavit with the clerk of the district court
stating the last known post-office address of the judgment debtor and the
judgment creditor.
(2) Upon the filing of a foreign judgment and affidavit, the clerk of the
district court shall notify the judgment debtor that the judgment has been
filed. Notice shall be sent to the address stated in the affidavit. The clerk shall
record the date the notice is mailed in the register of actions. The notice shall
include the name and post-office address of the judgment creditor and the
name and address of the judgment creditor's attorney, if any.
(3) No execution or other process for the enforcement of a foreign judgment
filed under this chapter may issue until 30 days after the judgment is filed.
History: C. 1953, 78-22a-3, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 169, § 1; L. 1984, ch. 36, § 1; 1986,
ch. 172, ft 1.

78-22a-4- Stay.
(1) If an appealfroma foreign judgment is pending, the time for appeal has
not expired, or a stay of execution has been granted, the court, upon proof that
the judgment debtor has furnished security for satisfaction of the judgment in
the state in which the judgment was rendered shall stay enforcement of the
judgment until the appeal is concluded, the time for appeal expires, or until
the stay of execution expires or is vacated.
(2) If the foreign judgment debtor, upon motion, shows the district court
any ground upon which enforcement of a judgment of a district court of this
state would be stayed, the court shall stay enforcement of the foreign judgment upon the posting of security in the kind and amount required to stay
enforcement of a domestic judgment.
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History: C. 1953, 78-22a-4, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 169, § 1.

78-22a-5, Lien.
(1) A foreign judgment filed under this chapter becomes a lien as provided
in Section 78-22-1 if a stay of execution has not been granted.
(2) If the requirements of this chapter are satisfied, the foreign judgment
becomes a lien upon the judgment debtor's property on the date it is docketed.
History: C. 1953, 7S-22a-5, enacted by L.
1983, ctu 169, i 1; L. 1984, ch, 36, i 2; 1986,
ch. 172, i 2.

78-22a-6. Optional procedure.
This chapter shall not be construed to impair a judgment creditor's right to
bring an action in this state to enforce such creditor's judgment.
History: C. 1953, 78-22a-6, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 169, I 1.

78-22a-7. Fees.
Fees for docketing, transcription, and other enforcement proceedings with
respect to foreign judgments shall be as provided in Sections 78-3-16.5,21-2-3,
and 21-2-4.
History: C. 1953, 78-22a-7, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 169, 8 1; 1990, ch. 128, fi 12.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-

ment, effective July 1, 1990, substituted
"78-3-16.5" for "21-2-2."

78-22a-8. Uniformity of interpretation.
This chapter shall be construed to effectuate the general purpose to make
uniform the law of those states which enact it.
History: C. 1953, 78-22a-8, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 169, § 1.

CHAPTER 22b
UNIFORM FOREIGN-MONEY CLAIMS
ACT
Section
78-22b-101.
78-22b-102.
78-22b-103.
78-22b-104.
78-22b-105.

Short title.
Definition*.
Scope.
Variation by agreement
Determining the money of the
claim.

Section
78-22b-106.
78-22b-107.
78-22b-108.
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Determining the amount of the
money of certain contract
claims.
Asserting and defending a foreign-money claim.
Judgments and awards on for-

UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION
Section

78-45c-7.

78-45c-8.

78-45c-9.

7$-45c-10.
78-45c-l 1.

78-45c-12.
78-45c-13.
78-45c-14.

78-45c-l

Section
Information exchange — Stay
of proceeding on notice of an
other proceeding.
Declining jurisdiction on finding of inconvenient forum —
Factors in determination —
Communication with other
court — Awarding costs.
Misconduct of petitioner as basis for refusing jurisdiction—
Notice to another jurisdiction
— Ordering petitioner to appear in other court or to return child — Awarding costs.
Information as to custody of
child and litigation concerning required in pleadings —
Verification — Continuing
duty to inform court.
Joinder of persons having custody or claiming custody or
visitation rights.
Ordering party to appear — Enforcement — Out-of-state
party — Travel and other expenses.
Parties bound by custody decree
— Conclusive unless modified.
Recognition and enforcement of
foreign decrees.
Modification of foreign decree

78-45c-ltt
78-45c-16.
78-45c-17.
7S-45c-18.
78~45c-19.

78-45c-20.

78-45c-21.
78-45c-22.
78-45c-23.
78-45c-24.
78-45C-25.
78-45c-26.

— Prerequisites — Factors
considered.
Filing foreign decree — Effect
— Enforcement — Award of
expenses.
Registry maintained by clerk of
court — Documents entered.
Certified copies of decrees furnished by clerk of court.
Taking testimony of persons in
other states.
Request to court of another
state to take evidence, to
make studies or to order appearance of party — Payment
of costs.
Taking evidence for use in court
of another state — Ordering
appearance in another state
— Costs — Enforcement.
Preservation of records of proceedings — Furnishing copies
to other state courts.
Requesting court records from
another state.
Foreign countries — Application of general policies.
Priority on court calendar.
Notices — Orders to appear —
Manner of service.
Short title.

78-45c-l. Purposes — Construction.
(1) The general purposes of this act are to:
(a) avoid jurisdiction competition and conflict with courts of other
states in matters of child custody which have in the past resulted in the
shifting of childrenfromstate to state with harmful effects on their wellbeing;
(b) promote cooperation with the courts of other states to the end that a
custody decree is rendered in that state which can best decide the case in
the interest of the child;
(c) assure that litigation concerning the custody of a child take place
ordinarily in the state with which the child and his family have the
closest connection and where significant evidence concerning his care,
protection, training, and personal relationships is most readily available,
and that courts of this state decline the exercise of jurisdiction when the
child and his family have a closer connection with another state;
(d) discourage continuing controversies over child custody in the interest of greater stability of home environment and of secure family relationships for the child;
(e) deter abductions and other unilateral removals of children undertaken to obtain custody awards;
(f) avoid relitigation of custody decisions of other states in this state
insofar as feasible;
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(g) facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other states;
(h) promote and expand the exchange of information and other forms of
mutual assistance between the courts of this state and those of other
states concerned with the same child; and
(i) to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
(2) This title shall be construed to promote the general purposes stated in
this section.
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, t 1.

act," as used in this section, means Laws 1980,

Meaning of "this act9* — The term "this

ch. 41, which enacted this chapter.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Validity, construction, and appliRights and obligations resulting from
cation of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction human artificial insemination, 83 AX.R4th
Act, 96 A.LJl3d 968.
295.
Kidnapping or related offense by taking or
chM custody: when does state that issued
removing of child by or under authority of par- preyiouB custody determination have continup a r e n t
A£^!F£!3^
^ Jurisdiction under
Uniform Child KidnapCustody
JvP
VZ **
* ^45^ A.L.R.4th
i HiSSSk
g ^ ^ n212.
Jurisdiction
child
custody
cases,
•wwuwwu nAct
u v(UCCJA)
u ^ i v or^ Parental
m u w iuuwqr
State court's authority, in marital or child P in * Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USCS
custody proceeding, to allocate federal income * 1738A, 83 A.LJUth 742.
tax dependency exemption for child to noncusParental rights of man who is not biological
todial parent under § 152(e) of the Internal or adoptive father of child but was husband or
Revenue Code (26 USCS S 152(e)), 77 cohabitant of mother when child was conceived
A.L.R.4th 786.
or born, 84 AXJUth 655.
Applicability of Uniform Child Custody JuChild custody and visitation rights of person
risdiction Act (UCCJA) to temporary custody infected with AIDS, 86 AJLIUth 211.
orders, 81 A.L.R.4th 1101.

78-45c-2. Definitions.
As used in this act:
(1) "Contestant" means a person, including a parent, who claims a
right to custody or visitation rights with respect to a child;
(2) "Custody determination" means a court decision and court orders
and instructions providing for the custody of a child, including visitation
rights; it does not include a decision relating to child support or any other
monetary obligation of any person;
(3) "Custody proceeding" includes proceedings in which a custody determination is one of several issues, such as an action for dissolution of
marriage, or legal separation, and includes child neglect and dependency
proceedings;
(4) "Decree" or "custody decree" means a custody determination contained in a judicial decree or order made in a custody proceeding, and
includes an initial decree and a modification decree;
(5) "Home state" means the state in which the child immediately preceding the time involved lived with his parents, a parent, or a person
acting as parent, for at least six consecutive months, and in the case of a
child less than six months old the state in which the child livedfrombirth
with any of the persons mentioned. Periods of temporary absence of any of
the named persons are counted as part of the six-month or other period;
(6) "Initial decree" means the first custody decree concerning a particular child;
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(7) "Modification decree" means a custody decree which modifies or
replaces a prior decree, whether made by the court which rendered the
prior decree or by another
court;
(8) "Physical custody7 means actual possession and control of a child;
(9) "Person acting as parent" means a person, other than a parent, who
has physical custody of a child and who has either been awarded custody
by the court or claims a right to custody; and
(10) "State" means any state, territory or possession of the United
States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia.
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 2.
Meaning of "this act" — See note following same catchline in notes to S 78-45c-l.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AXJL — What types of proceedings or determinations are governed by the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or the

Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA),
78 A.L.R4th 1028.

78-45c-3. Bases of jurisdiction in this state.
(1) A court of this state which is competent to decide child custody matters
has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial or modification decree if the conditions as set forth in any of the following paragraphs are
met:
(a) this state:
(i) is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of
the proceeding; or
(ii) had been the child's home state within six months before commencement of the proceeding and the child is absentfromthis state
because of his removal or retention by a person claiming his custody
or for other reasons, and a parent or person acting as parent continues to live in this state;
(b) it is in the best interest of the child that a court of this state assume
jurisdiction because:
(i) the child and his parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with this state; and
(ii) there is available in this state substantial evidence concerning
the child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal
relationships;
(c) the child is physically present in this state or this state is the most
recent domicile of the mother prior to the birth of the child, and:
(i) the child has been abandoned; or
(ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he
has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is
otherwise neglected or dependent; or
(d) (i) it appears that no other state would have jurisdiction under
prerequisites substantially in accordance with Subsection (l)(a), (b),
or (c), or another state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the
ground that this state is the more appropriate forum to determine the
custody of the child; and
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(ii) it is in the best interest of the child that this court assume
jurisdiction.
(2) Except under Subsections (l)(c) and (d), physical presence in this state
of the child, or of the child and one of the contestants, is not alone sufficient to
confer jurisdiction on a court of this state to make a child custody determination.
(3) Physical presence of the child, while desirable, is not a prerequisite for
jurisdiction to determine his custody.
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, i 3; 1990, ch- 143,
§ 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, added "or this
state is the most recent domicile of the mother

prior to the birth of the child," at the end of the
introductory paragraph in Subsection (lXc)
and made stylistic changes and changes in
punctuation throughout

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Appropriate forum.
Emergency jurisdiction.
—Permanent custody.
Appropriate forum.
Utah district court appropriately retained jurisdiction under the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act to make any determinations regarding custody, visitation or other
matters relevant to the children, where the
parents were divorced in Utah and, although
the mother had taken the children to Washington, that state specifically declined to exercise
jurisdiction because of Utah's past and present
involvement with the matter. Rawlings v.
Weiner, 752 P.2d 1327 (Utah Ct. App.), cert,
denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988).
This chapter does not give a preference to
the "home state." The significant connection or
substantial connection basis comes into play
either when the home state test cannot be met
or as an alternative to that test. In re W.D. v.
Drake, 770 P.2d 1011 (Utah C t App.), cert
denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989).
Even though a certain state may be the
"home state," if the child and his family have
equal or stronger ties with another state that
other state also has jurisdiction. In re WD . v.

Drake, 770 P.2d 1011 (Utah Ct. App.), cert
denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989).
Judge did not abuse his discretion in deciding that California was the more appropriate
and convenient forum to litigate custody and in
granting the state's motion to dismiss the natural parents' petition, where substantial information concerning the parents' abilities and
past history was in California, the mother had
only recently come to Utah but had lived for
years in California, and the parents' purpose in
coming to Utah was to shop for jurisdiction. In
re W.D. v. Drake, 770 P.2d 1011 (Utah Ct
App.), cert denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989).
Emergency jurisdiction.
Emergency jurisdiction under Subsection
(l)(c) is reserved for extraordinary circumstances. Emergency jurisdiction should be limited to those cases of neglect where the harm is
immediate or imminent. In re D.S.K., 792 P.2d
118 (Utah C t App. 1990).
—Permanent custody.
An assumption of emergency jurisdiction is
an assumption of temporary jurisdiction only;
it does not confer upon the state the authority
to make a permanent custody disposition. In re
DJS.K., 792 P.2d 118 (Utah C t App. 1990).

78-45c-4. Persons to be notified and heard.
Before making a decree under this act, reasonable notice and opportunity to
be heard shall be given to the contestants, any parent whose parental rights
have not been previously terminated, and any person who has physical custody of the child. If any of these persons is outside this state, notice and
opportunity to be heard shall be given pursuant to Section 78-45c-5.
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History: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 4.
Meaning of "this act'* — See note following same catchline in notes to i 78-45c-l.

78-45c-5. , Service of notice outside state — Proof of svv\ ice
— Submission to jurisdiction.
(1) Notice required for the exercise ofjurisdiction over a person outside this
state shall be given in a manner reasonably calculated to give actual notice,
and may be made in any of the following ways:
(a) by personal delivery outside this state in the manner prescribed for
service of process within this state;
(b) in the manner prescribed by the law of the place in which the
service is made for service of process in that place in an action in any of
its courts of general jurisdiction;
(c) by any form of mail addressed to the person to be served and requesting a receipt; or
(d) as directed by the court (including publication, if other means of
notification are ineffective).
(2) Notice under this section shall be served, mailed, delivered, or last published at least 10 days before any hearing in this state.
(3) Proof of service outside this state may be made by affidavit of the individual who made the service, or in the manner prescribed by the law of this
state, the order pursuant to which the service is made, or the law of the place
in which the service is made. If service is made by mail, proof may be a receipt
signed by the addressee or other evidence of delivery to the addressee.
(4) Notice is not required if a person submits to the jurisdiction of the court.
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, { 5.
Cross-References. — Service of process,
Rule 4, U.R.C.P.

78-45c-6. Proceedings pending elsewhere — Jurisdiction
not exercised — Inquiry to other state — Information exchange — Stay of proceeding on notice
of another proceeding.
(1) A court of this state shall not exercise its jurisdiction under this act if at
the time of filing the petition a proceeding concerning the custody of the child
was pending in a court of another state exercising jurisdiction substantially in
conformity with this act, unless the proceeding is stayed by the court of the
other state because this state is a more appropriate forum or for other reasons.
(2) Before hearing the petition in a custody proceeding the court shall examine the pleadings and other information supplied by the parties under
Section 78-45c-10 and shall consult the child custody registry established
under Section 78-45c-16 concerning the pendency of proceedings with respect
to the child in other states. If the court has reason to believe that proceedings
may be pending in another state it shall direct an inquiry to the state court
administrator or other appropriate official of the other state.
(3) If the court is informed during the course of the proceeding that a proceeding concerning the custody of the child was pending in another state
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before the court assumed jurisdiction it shall stay the proceeding and communicate with the court in which the other proceeding is pending to the end
that the issue may be litigated in the more appropriate forum and that information be exchanged in accordance with Sections 78-45c-19 through
78-45c-22. If a court of this state has made a custody decree before being
informed of a pending proceeding in a court of another state it shall immediately inform that court of the fact. If the court is informed that a proceeding
was commenced in another state after it assumed jurisdiction it shall likewise
inform the other court to the end that the issues may be litigated in the more
appropriate forum.
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, | 6.
Meaning of "this act" — See note following same catchline in notes to 8 78-45c-l.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
sues could be litigated in the more appropriate
forum, where the child resided in Oregon at
Pending foreign proceeding.
the time and the Oregon court had appointed
—Stay of Utah action.
the child's grandparents as guardians. CopProceedings elsewhere.
pedge v. Harding, 714 P.2d 1121 (Utah 1985).
Pending foreign proceeding.
Proceedings elsewhere.
Where grandparents in Oregon, with whom
—Stay of Utah action.
child was visiting, had won custody in Oregon
Utah district court, after learning of prior court, Utah district court was required to stay
guardianship proceedings in Oregon, was re- parents' proceeding seeking custody determiquired to stay a Utah action seeking to deter- nation and to communicate with Oregon court
mine child custody and to communicate with to determine the propriety of further proceedthe* Oregon court to determine the propriety of ings in Oregon. Coppedge v. Harding, 714 P.2d
further proceedings in Oregon, so that the is- 1121 (Utah 1985).
ANALYSIS

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — What types of proceedings or de- Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA),
terminations are governed by the Uniform 78 A.L.R4th 1028.
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or the

78-45c-7. Declining jurisdiction on finding of inconvenient
forum — Factors in determination — Communication with other court — Awarding costs.
(1) A court which has jurisdiction under this act to make an initial or
modification decree may decline to exercise its jurisdiction any time before
making a decree if it finds that it is an inconvenient forum to make a custody
determination under the circumstances of the case and that a court of another
state is a more appropriate forum.
(2) A finding of inconvenient forum may be made upon the court's own
motion or upon motion of a party or a guardian ad litem or other representative of the child.
(3) In determining if it is an inconvenient forum, the court shall consider if
it is in the interest of the child that another state assume jurisdiction. For this
purpose it may take into account the following factors, among others:
(a) if another state is or recently was the child's home state;
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(b) if another state has a closer connection with the child and his family or with the child and one or more of the contestants;
(c) if substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care,
protection, training, and personal relationships is more readily available
in another state;
(d) if the parties have agreed on another forum which is no less appropriate; and
(e) if the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of this state would contravene any of the purposes stated in Section 78-45c-l.
(4) Before determining whether to decline or retain jurisdiction the court
may communicate with a court of another state and exchange information
pertinent to the assumption of jurisdiction by either court with a view to
assuring that jurisdiction will be exercised by the more appropriate court and
that a forum will be available to the parties.
(5) If the court finds that it is an inconvenient forum and that a court of
another state is a more appropriate forum, it may dismiss the proceedings, or
it may stay the proceedings upon condition that a custody proceeding be
promptly commenced in another named state or upon any other conditions
which may be just and proper, including the condition that a moving party
stipulate his consent and submission to the jurisdiction of the other forum.
(6) The court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under this act if a
custody determination is incidental to an action for divorce or another proceeding while retaining jurisdiction over the divorce or other proceeding.
(7) If it appears to the court that it is clearly an inappropriate forum it may
require the party who commenced the proceedings to pay, in addition to the
costs of the proceedings in this state, necessary travel and other expenses,
including attorney's fees, incurred by other parties or their witnesses. Payment is to be made to the clerk of the court for remittance to the proper party.
(8) Upon dismissal or stay of proceedings under this section the court shall
inform the court found to be the more appropriate forum of this fact, or if the
court which would have jurisdiction in the other state is not certainly known,
shall transmit the information to the court administrator or other appropriate
official for forwarding to the appropriate court.
(9) Any communication receivedfromanother state informing this state of
a finding of inconvenient forum because a court of this state is the more
appropriate forum shall be filed in the custody registry of the appropriate
court. Upon assuming jurisdiction the court of this state shall inform the
original court of this fact.
History: L. 1080, ch. 41, ft 7.
Meaning of "this act" — See note following same catchline in notes to S 78-45c-l.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Appropriate forum elsewhere.
Communicationiwith other court
^tAd t t e n TecOTdm
Clte<1
*
Appropriate forum elsewhere.
Judge did not abuse his discretion in decid-

ing that California was the more appropriate
and convenient forum to litigate custody and in
granting the state's motion to dismiss the nat^ parents' petition, where substantial information concerning the parents' abilities and
past history was in California, the mother had
only recently come to Utah but had lived for
years in California, and the parents' purpose in
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coming to Utah was to shop for jurisdiction. In
re W.D. v. Drake, 770 P.2d 1011 (Utah Ct.
App.), cert denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1990).

their conclusions and the basis for any agreement should be set forth clearly in the record.
In re D.S.K., 792 P.2d 118 (Utah Ct App.

Communication with other court

1990)

—Written record.
When judges communicate by telephone,
they should make a prompt written record of

*

Cited m

T**11* v - ?****>735 P 2 d 3*2 (Utah
1987); Rawlings v. Weiner, 752 P.2d 1327
(Utah Ct App. 1988).

78-45c-8. Misconduct of petitioner as basis for refusing jurisdiction — Notice to another jurisdiction — Ordering petitioner to appear in other court or to
return child — Awarding costs.
(1) If the petitioner for an initial decree has wrongfully taken the child
from another state or has engaged in similar reprehensible conduct the court
may decline to exercise jurisdiction for purposes of adjudication of custody if
this is just and proper under the circumstances.
(2) Unless required in the interest of the child, the court shall not exercise
its jurisdiction to modify a custody decree of another state if the petitioner,
without consent of the person entitled to custody has improperly removed the
child from the physical custody of the person entitled to custody or has improperly retained the child after a visit or other temporary relinquishment of
physical custody. If the petitioner has violated any other provision of a custody decree of another state the court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if
this is just and proper under the circumstances.
(3) Where the court declines to exercise jurisdiction upon petition for an
initial custody decree pursuant to Subsection (1), the court shall notify the
parent or other appropriate person and the prosecuting attorney of the appropriate jurisdiction in the other state. If a request to that effect is received from
the other state, the court shall order the petitioner to appear with the child in
a custody proceeding instituted in the other state in accordance with Section
78-45c-20. If no such request is made within a reasonable time after such
notification, the court may entertain a petition to determine custody by the
petitioner if it has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-45c-2 [78-45c-3].
(4) Where the court refuses to assume jurisdiction to modify the custody
decree of another state pursuant to Subsection (2) or pursuant to Section
78-45c-14, the court shall notify the person who has legal custody under the
decree of the other state and the prosecuting attorney of the appropriate
jurisdiction in the other state and may order the petitioner to return the child
to the person who has legal custody. If it appears that the order will be
ineffective and the legal custodian is ready to receive the child within a period
of a few days, the court may place the child in a foster care home for such
period, pending return of the child to the legal custodian. At the same time,
the court shall advise the petitioner that any petition for modification of
custody must be directed to the appropriate court of the other state which has
continuing jurisdiction, or, in the event that that court declines jurisdiction, to
a court in a state which has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-45c-3.
(5) In appropriate cases a court dismissing a petition under this section
may charge the petitioner with necessary travel and other expenses, including
attorney's fees and the cost of returning the child to another state.
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History: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 8.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Misconduct of petitioner.
Cited._
M
j -A * x**i
MUconduct of^petitioner.
Fact that children were present in county of
residence of father who brought action to modify the child custody provisions of a foreign divorce decree did not make the father's county

of residence the proper venue for the action
since the children's presence was the result of
the father's wrongful refusal to return the children to their mother, who had custody under
t*16 decree, after a visitation period. Angell v.
Sixth Judicial Dist Court, 656 P.2d 405 (Utah
1982).
Cited in Coppedge v. Harding, 714 P*2d
1121 (Utah 1985).

78-45c-9- Information as to custody of child and litigation
concerning required in pleadings — Verification
— Continuing duty to inform court
(1) Every party in a custody proceeding in his first pleading or in an affidavit attached to that pleading shall give information under oath as to the
child's present address, the places where the child has lived within the last
five years, and the names and present addresses of the persons with whom the
child has lived during that period. In this pleading or affidavit every party
shall further declare under oath as to each of the following whether:
(a) he has participated, as a party, witness, or in any other capacity, in
any other litigation concerning the custody of the same child in this or
any other state;
(b) he has information of any custody proceeding concerning the child
pending in a court of this or any other state; and
(c) he knows of any person not a party to the proceedings who has
physical custody of the child or claims to have custody or visitation rights
with respect to the child.
(2) If the declaration as to any of the above items is in the affirmative the
declarant shall give additional information under oath as required by the
court. The court may examine the parties under oath as to details of the
information furnished and as to other matters pertinent to the court's jurisdiction and the disposition of the case.
(3) Each party has a continuing duty to inform the court of any custody
proceeding concerning the child in this or any other state of which he obtained
information during this proceeding.
History: L. 1980, rh 41, § 9.

78-45c-10. Joinder of persons having custody or claiming
custody or visitation rights.
If the court learns from information furnished by the parties pursuant to
Section 78-45c-9 orfromother sources that a person not a party to the custody
proceeding has physical custody of the child or claims to have custody or
visitation rights with respect to the child, it shall order that person to be
joined as a party and to be duly notified of the pendency of the proceeding and
of his joinder as a party. If the person joined as a party is outside this state he
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shall be served with process or otherwise notified in accordance with Section
78-45c-5.
History: L. 1980v ch. 41, I 10.

78-45c-ll. Ordering party to appear — Enforcement —
Out-of-state party — Travel and other expenses.
(1) The court may order any party to the proceeding who is in this state to
appear personally before the court. If that party has physical custody of the
child the court may order that he appear personally with the child. If the
party who is ordered to appear with the child cannot be served or fails to obey
the order, or it appears the order will be ineffective, the court may issue a
warrant of arrest against such party to secure his appearance with the child.
(2) If a party to the proceeding whose presence is desired by the court is
outside this state with or without the child the court may order that the notice
given under Section 78-45c-5 include a statement directing that party to appear personally with or without the child and declaring that failure to appear
may result in a decision adverse to that party.
(3) If a party to the proceeding who is outside this state is directed to appear
under Subsection (2) or desires to appear personally before the court with or
without the child, the court may require another party to pay to the clerk of
the court travel and other necessary expenses of the party so appearing and of
the child if this is just and proper under the circumstances.
History; L. 1980, eh. 41, | 11.

78-45c-12. Parties bound by custody decree — Conclusive
unless modified.
A custody decree rendered by a court of this state which had jurisdiction
under Section 78-45c-3, binds all parties who have been served in this state or
notified in accordance with Section 78-45c-5 or who have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court, and who have been given an opportunity to be heard.
As to these parties the custody decree is conclusive as to all issues of law and
fact decided and as to the custody determination made unless and until that
determination is modified pursuant to law, including the provisions of this
act.
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 12.
Meaning of "this act" — See note following same catchline in notes to 5 78-45c*L
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AXJL — Liability of legal or natural parent, or one who aids and abets, for damages

resulting from abduction of own child, 49
AXJUth7.
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78-45c-13. Recognition and enforcement of foreign decrees.
The courts of this state shall recognize and enforce an initial or modification
decree of a court of another state which had assumed jurisdiction under statutory provisions substantially in accordance with this act or which was made
under factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of the act, so
long as this decree has not been modified in accordance with jurisdictional
standards substantially similar to those of this act.
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, 5 13.
Meaning of 'Hhia act" — See note following same catchline in notes to S 78-45c-l.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
CJJS. — 50 C J.S. Judgments S 889.

78-45c-l I

Modification of foreign decree
— Factors considered.

Prerequisites

(1) If a court of another state has made a custody decree, a court of this
state shall not modify that decree unless (a) it appears to the court of this
state that the court which rendered the decree does not now have jurisdiction
under jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in accordance with this act or
has declined to assume jurisdiction to modify the decree and (b) the court of
this state has jurisdiction.
(2) If a court of this state is authorized under Subsection (1) and Section
78-45c-8 to modify a custody decree of another state it shall give due consideration to the transcript of the record and other documents of all previous proceedings submitted to it in accordance with Section 78-45c-22.
History: L. 1380, ch. 41, t 14.
Meaning of "this act" — See note following same catchline in notes to § 7 8-4 5c-1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Communication with foreign court.
Lack of jurisdiction.
Cited.
„
. .,
..» m ,
,
Communication with foreign court
Where Oregon court had already adjudicated
custody issue and it appeared that Oregon's ezercise of jurisdiction was proper, Utah district
court was required to stay proceeding seeking
custody determination and Oregon decree was
not subject to modification until Utah court
had communicated with Oregon court under
§ 78-45c-6(3) to determine the propriety of fur-

ther proceedings in Oregon. Coppedge v. Harding, 714 P.2d 1121 (Utah 1985).
L ^ o f jurisdiction.
A juvenile court lacked jurisdiction under either this chapter or the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 to modify permanently a Florida custody decree by award^ custody to the father, it improperly granted
temporary custody to the father, after the
mother had brought the children to Utah while
divorce proceedings were pending in Florida.
In re D.S.K., 792 P.2d 118 (Utah Ct. App.
1990).
Cited in Kelly v. Draney, 754 P.2d 92 (Utah
Ct App. 1988).
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78-45c-15. Filing foreign decree — Effect — Enforcement
— Award of expenses.
(1) A certified copy of a custody decree of another state may be filed in the
office of the clerk of any district court of this state. The clerk shall treat the
decree in the same manner as a custody decree of the district court of this
state. A custody decree so filed has the same effect and shall be enforced in
like manner as a custody decree rendered by a court of this state.
(2) A person violating a custody decree of another state which makes it
necessary to enforce the decree in this state may be required to pay necessary
travel and other expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by the party
entitled to the custody or his witnesses.
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, i 15.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AX.R. — Attorneys' fee awards in parentnonparent child custody case, 45 A.L.R.4th
212.

78-45c-16. Registry maintained by clerk of court — Documents entered.
The clerk of each district court shall maintain a registry in which he shall
enter all of the following:
(1) certified copies of custody decrees of other states received for filing;
(2) communications as to the pendency of custody proceedings in other
states;
(3) communications concerning a finding of inconvenient forum by a
court of another state; and
(4) other communications or documents concerning custody proceedings in another state which may affect the jurisdiction of a court of this
state or the disposition to be made by it in a custody proceeding.
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, f 16.

78-45c-17. Certified copies of decrees furnished by clerk
of court.
The clerk of a district court of this state, at the request of the court of
another state or at the request of any person who is affected by or has a
legitimate interest in a custody decree, shall certify and forward a copy of the
decree to that court or person.
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, t 17.
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78-45c-18. Taking testimony of persons in other states.
In addition to other procedural devices available to a party, any party to the
proceeding or a guardian ad litem or other representative of the child may
adduce testimony of witnesses, including parties and the child, by deposition
or otherwise, in another state. The court on its own motion may direct that the
testimony of a person be taken in another state and may prescribe the manner
in which and the terms upon which the testimony shall be taken.
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, S 18.

78-45c-19. Request to court of another state to take evidence, to make studies or to order appearance of
party — Payment of costs.
(1) A court of this state may request the appropriate court of another state
to hold a hearing to adduce evidence, to order a party to produce or give
evidence under other procedures of that state, or to have social studies made
with respect to the custody of a child involved in proceedings pending in the
court of this state; and to forward to the court of this state certified copies of
the transcript of the record of the hearing, the evidence otherwise adduced, or
any social studies prepared in compliance with the request. The cost of the
services may be assessed against the parties.
(2) A court of this state may request the appropriate court of another state
to order a party to custody proceedings pending in the court of this state to
appear in the proceedings, and if that party has physical custody of the child,
to appear with the child. The request may state that travel and other necessary expenses of the party and of the child whose appearance is desired will be
assessed against another party or will otherwise be paid.
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, i 19.

78-45c-20. Taking evidence for use in court of another
state — Ordering appearance in another state —
Costs — Enforcement
(1) Upon request of the court of another state the courts of this state which
are competent to hear custody matters may order a person in this state to
appear at a hearing to adduce evidence or to produce or give evidence under
other procedures available in this state. A certified copy of the transcript of
the record of the hearing or the evidence otherwise adduced shall be forwarded by the clerk of the court to the requesting court.
(2) A person within this state may voluntarily give his testimony or statement in this state for use in a custody proceeding outside this state.
(3) Upon request of the court of another state a competent court of this state
may order a person in this state to appear alone or with the child in a custody
proceeding in another state. The court may condition compliance with the
request upon assurance by the other state that travel and other necessary
expenses will be advanced or reimbursed. If the person who has physical
custody of the child cannot be served or fails to obey the order, or it appears
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the order will be ineffective, the court may issue a warrant of arrest against
such person to secure his appearance with the child in the other state.
History: L. 1980, ch* 41, I 20.

78-45c-21. Preservation of records of proceedings — Furnishing copies to other state courts.
In any custody proceeding in this state the court shall preserve the pleadings, orders and decrees, any record that has been made of its hearings, social
studies, and other pertinent documents until the child reaches 18 years of age.
Upon appropriate request of the court of another state the court shall forward
to the other court certified copies of any or all of such documents.
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, i 21.

78-45c-22. Requesting court records from another state.
If a custody decree has been rendered in another state concerning a child
involved in a custody proceeding pending in a court of this state, the court of
this state upon taking jurisdiction of the case shall request of the court of the
other state a certified copy of the transcript of any court record and other
documents mentioned in Section 78-45c-21.
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 22.

78-45c-23. Foreign countries — Application of general policies.
The general policies of this act extend to the international area. The provisions of this act relating to the recognition and enforcement of custody decrees
of other states apply to custody decrees and decrees involving legal institutions similar in nature to custody rendered by appropriate authorities of other
nations if reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard were given to all
affected persons.
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, 5 23.
Meaning of "this act." — See note following same catchline in notes to § 78-45c-l.

78-45c-24. Priority on court calendar.
Upon the request of a party to a custody proceeding which raises a question
of existence or exercise of jurisdiction under this act the case shall be given
calendar priority and handled expeditiously.
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, ! 24.
Meaning of "this act" — See note following same catchline in notes to I 78-45c-L
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78-45c-25. Notices — Orders to appear — Manner of service.
(1) Whenever the terms of this act impose a duty upon the court to notify a
party or court of a particular fact or action, such notification may be accomplished by the clerk of the court or a party to the action upon order of the
court.
(2) Orders of the court for parties or persons to appear before the court in
accordance with the terms of this act shall include legal and sufficient service
of process in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise ordered for good cause shown.
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, i 25.
Meaning of "this act" — See note following same catchline in notes to S 78-45c-l.

78-45c-26. Short title.
This act may be cited as the "Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act."
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, I 26.
Meaning of 'Hhis act" — See note following same catchline in notes to S 78-45c-l.

Uniform Laws. — All of the states and the
District of Columbia have enacted the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 42 Am. Jur. 2d §§ 33 to 41.

CHAPTER 45d
CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTION
(Repealed by Laws 1988, ch. 1, ( 407.)

78-45d-l to 78-45d-13. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1988, ch. 1, § 407 repeals and 3 to 10, relating to child support collection,
§§ 78-45d-l to 78-45d-13, as enacted by Laws effective January 19,1988. For present compa1985, ch. 11, § 2 and Laws 1987, ch. 89, § 2, rable provisions, see §§ 62A-11-401 to
and as last amended by Laws 1987, ch. 89, §§ 1 62A-11-414.
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5th Judicial District C*itf - far *>, <-?,

F I L E

SCOTT M. BURNS (#4283)
Iron County Attorney
97 North Main, Suite #1
P.O. Box 428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-6694
Telecopier: (801) 586-2737

£•

JAN 1 81996
^ v^

I/: •-. TV

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

)
Plaintiff,

AMENDED INFORMATION

)

vs.

)

ROBERT FRIIS,
d.o.b. 11/23/49,

)

Criminal No. 951500586

)

Judge J. Philip Eves

Defendant.
The undersigned complainant, Scott M. Burns, Iron County Attorney, states on information
and belief that the above-named Defendant, ROBERT FRIIS, committed the following crime, to wit:
CUSTODIAL INTERFERENCE, a Third-Degree, in violation of
Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 303, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended, in that on or about June 10, 1995, and until on or about
August 20,1995, in Iron County, State of Utah, the said Robert Friis
did take, entice, conceal, or detain a child or children under the age of
16 from its parent, guardian, or lawful custodian knowing the actor
has no legalrightto do so; and with the intent to hold the child for a
period substantially longer that the visitation or custody period
previously awarded by a court of competent jurisdiction; and the child
or children were removed and takenfromone state to another.

This Information is based on evidence provided by Chief Wayne Townsend and Officer

0J7?

Preston Griffiths of the Parowan Police Department and Lee and Linda Pace.
DATED this

0*

day of January, 1996.

SCOTT M BURNS
Iron County Attorney

2
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Addendum C

NAME AND ADDRESS OF ATTORNEY:

OR COURT USE ONLY

TELEPHONE NO.:

ALAN CARLISLE, ESQ
(909) 944-8880
10601 CIVIC CENTER DR STE 200
RANCHO CUCAMONGA CA 91730-380M
ATTORNEY FOR:

ROBERT FRIIS

Insert name of court, judicial district or branch court, if any, and Post Office and Street Address:

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO
8307 HAVEN AVE.

RANCHO CUCAMONGA CA 91730
PLAINTIFF:

ROBERT E FRIIS

DEFENDANT:

LINDA M FRIIS

EXEMPLIFICATION OF RECORD
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

Case Number:

RFL Q1W

ss.

I, the undersigned, Deputy Clerk of the above-entitled Court, do hereby certify and attest that the attached, consisting of
1

page(s), is a full, true, and correct copy of the original

STIPULATION RE CUSTODY AND

VISITATION AND ORDER THEREON

on file in my office, and that I have fully compared the s
n«t»rf

JANUARY 2 3 , 1996

, Deputy Clerk

(SEAL)

(SEAL)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

)
j

I, the undersigned, Judge of the above-entitled Court, do hereby certify that SHARON SORRELS
\s the deputy clerk of the above-entitled court, which is a court of mrnrrl having a nnnlj thqtthc seal affixed thereto
is the seal of said court; that the said clerk is the legal cusjjjiJimi uf tjjg^irtgTnal record(s) or docthrient(s) described and
referred to in the foregoing certificate and attestatiopr^nd that supKcertifftate and attestations if) due fojvn according
to the laws of the State of California.
Dated

JANUARY 2 3 , 1996

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

ss.

I, the undersigned, Deputy Clerk of the above-entitled Court, which is a court of record having a seal, which seal is affixed
hereto, do hereby certify that JOSEPH E JOHNSTON
t whose name is subscribed to the foregoing
certificate was, at the time of signing the same, Judge of the above-entitled court, and was duly commissioned,
qualified, and authorized by law to execute said certifica*er>and that the signature to the foregoing certificate is the
genuine signature of the judge above-named.
(
\jf r
IJrc
/I
/

03C1
., Deputy Clerk

Evidtnct Cod« 1400. 1531

- -»

1
i>

•"» C JL'

Q ^ : ^ l

I'

ir»T T«?PIIF-V P I C H f t P P

fc*

SMOL1II

*?92?239

FILED-West District
StnfcmtrtfiooCfWtvC**

A l / i l ! CARLISLE, ESQ.
10601 C i v i c C a n t o r D r . , S u i t e 200
Raneho CUcamongn, CA 9 1 7 3 0 - 3 8 0 4
(909) 944-8880

FEB09»4

3
Attorney for

ROBERT E. FRIIS

4
5
6
SUPERIOR COURT OF CAM FORI! 1A

7
COUIITY OF SAIf BF.RHARDIHO

8
9
) CASE HOtRFL 01 •54 1
)

In re Marriage of
10

Petitioner: ROBERT E. FRTIS
11
12

)
)
)
)

and
R e s p o n d e n t : LtllDA H. FRTIS

)

13

THE

14

PARTIES

TO

STirUJATJOtl RE
CUSTODY AllD
VISITATION AllD
ORDER 11IEREUII

THE

WTTHIH

ACTION,

THROUGH

THEIR

15

RESPECTIVE COUHSEL. HEREBY STIPUJATE THE COURT MAKE THE FOLLOWIHG

16

ORDERS:

17

THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS:

1.8

1.

Legal custody of the minor child of the parties,

19| ROBERT DEMIM FRIIS, born 12/13/93, is awarded jointly to the
parties. Mutual consent of both parties shall be required for the
major decisions relating to the child's health, education and
welfare. Failure to obtain consent may result in contempt action,
jail sentence, or change or loss of custody.
Primary physical custody for the care, custody and
control of minor child to be with Respondent: however. Petitioner
shall have physical care, custody and control of the minor child as
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41

r . Each month from the second Saturday at 8:00 AH to the

51 third Sunday at 6i00 PM commencing February, 1994.
61

b . Christmas 1994, the entire Christmas school vacation,

7 J commencing 6J00 PH the last day of school before the vacation and
81 ending 6:00 PH the day before school resumes, and thereafter on
91 alternate years.
101

c.

Thanksgiving vacation 1995, from 4:00 PM the day

ill before said vacation to 6:00 PM the day before school resumes and
12i thereafter on alternate years.
13|

d. Summer vacation - 1994. An extra week in June, July

141 and August, which will be contiguous with regular custody period.
151 The decision as to whether it will be prior to or after regular
16| custody period to be determined by the parties.
171

Summer vacation - commencing 1995. The first six

181 (6) weeks of school vacation commencing 6:00 PM the last day before
191 the vacation and ending at 6:00 PM on Sunday six weeks later.
20| During said vacation period, at the end of three weeks, Respondent
2l| will have visitation from Friday at 4:00 PM until Sunday at 6:00
221 PM.
231

During the second six weeks of school vacation, while

241 custody is with Respondent, Petitioner will have weekend visitation
251 from Friday at 4:00 PM until Sunday at 6:00 PH, during the mid26 I point of said period.
271
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II

rick-tip and delivery will be ah Hie folic* ntftt.iott In
r>rowan, Utah, with * 5! hour Trace period.

** either party

anticipates a delay beyond that "window" they are required, as eoon
an U

practical, to advise the Watch Commander at rarowan Police

Department of eald delay and revised estimated time of arrival.
neither parent is to use disparaging remarks, nor
allow any other pereon to use dlaparaqlng remarks, about tho oth«»t
parent in front of th*» child.
neither parent in to use corporal puiitrtlimetit on tho
10 minor child.
Each parent should promote
Jt

and encourage mutual

reopect and affection for the other parent.

The child should be

13

led to believe that It ir. appropriate for him to love and to value

14

both mother and fathot.

15

Approved as to form ahd content.

16
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19

RICHARD 9M0LIII
At^wheu)
for RRespondent
heu for

20
21

V

Dated!
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MICUARt. DARL1II6T0II

Attorney for Minor child
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Addendum D

.•OR COURT USE ONLY

TELEPHONE NO.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF ATTORNEY:

RICHARD SMOLIN, ESQ
(909)
LAW OFFICES OF RICHARD SMOLIN
1076 BROCKTON AVE
RIVERSIDE, CA 92501

928-1902

ATTORNEY FOR:
Insert name of court, judicial district or branch court, if any, and Post Office and Street Address:

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO
8307 HAVEN AVE.

RANCHO CUCAMONGA CA 91730
PLAINTIFF:

ROBERT FRIIS
DEFENDANT:

LINDA FRIIS
Case Number:

EXEMPLIFICATION OF RECORD
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

RFL 01543

ss.

I, the undersigned, Deputy Clerk of the above-entitled Court, do hereby certify and attest that the attached, consisting of
16

page(s), is a full, true, and correct copy of the original

JUDGMENT

on file in my office, and that I have fully compared the saprm^ wytythe originaKs
Dated

, Deputy Clerk

JANUARY 2 3 , 1996

(SEAL)

(SEAL)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

ss.

I, the undersigned, Judge of the above-entitled Court, do hereby certify that
SHARON SORRELS
is the deputy clerk of the above-entitled court, which is a court of record having a seal; that the seal affixed thereto
is the seal of said court; that the said clerk is the legal nmndjan sf th^nrjoinrrfTfcordblttr^documentte) described and
referred to in the foregoing certificate and attestation; amfthat such certrocate and atte^ltftiqn is in due form according
to the laws of the State of California.
patftd

JANUARY 2 3 , 1996

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

ss.

I, the undersigned, Deputy Clerk of the above-entitled Court, which is a court of record having a seal, which seal is affixed
hereto, do hereby certify that JOSEPH E JOHNSTON
, whose name is subscribed to the foregoing
certificate was, at the time of signing the same, Judge of the above-entitled court, and was duly commissioned,
qualified, and authorized by law to execute said certificate^ and that the sigpatyrejto the foregoing certificate is the
genuine signature of the judge above-named.

LhjnJ

02S7
., Deputy Clerk

k%TQRNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Nsme tnc

TfcLfcHHUNfc n u :

Ac&t

(909)

RICHARD SMOLIN, Esq.
Law Offices of Richard Smolin
4076 Brockton Ave
Riverside, CA 92501
(N*me)~ P e t i t i o n e r
£ SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF
STREET ADDRESS: 4 1 6 4 B r o c k t o n A v e

**£?>•*

ATTORNEY FOR

MAILING ADDRESS:

CITYANOZIPCODEBRANCH NAME

P«

0*

BOX

San

rwn bvwni I M C wnki

928-1902

Bernardino

MAY

4 3 1

R i v e r s i d e , CA 9 2 5 0 1
F a m i l y Lav Annex
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MARRIAGE O F
PETITIONER:

RESPONDENT:

ROBERT FRIIS
LINDA F R I I S
CASE NUMBER:

JUDGMENT
I
I Legal separation

I X I Dissolution
I
I Nullity
RFL 0 1 5 4 3
L_J Status only
y. y
L_J Reserving jurisdiction over termination of marital status
8 199$

Date marital status ends: UPON SIGNATURE OF THE JUDGE
This proceeding was heard as follows: 1 X 1 default or uncontested I
1 by declaration under Civil Code. § 4511 I
I contested
a. Date: 1 0 / 1 2 / 9 4 1 3 / * ^ * Dept: 1 1
Rm.:
> b. Judge (name): DENNIS COLE
L - J Temporary judge
• c. I X I Petitioner present in court
I
I Attorney present in court (name): I N PRO-PER
• d- L2L1 Respondent present in court
L.XJ Attorney present in court (name): RICHARD S M O L I N , E s q .
e. 1 I Claimant present in court (name):
I
I Attorney present in court (name):
Z The court acquired jurisdiction of the respondent on (date): 8 / 1 8 / 9 3
1 X I Respondent was served with process
I X I Respondent appeared
3. THE COURT ORDERS, GOOD CAUSE APPEARING:
a. I X I Judgment of dissolution be entered. Marital status is terminated and the parties are restored to the status of unmarried persons
W I X 1 on the following date (specify):
^mmm^ (2) I
I on a date to be determined on noticed motion of either party or on stipulation.
•1 t>- I j Judgment of legal separation be entered.
>l c- j
j Judgment of nullity be entered. The parties are declared to be unmarried persons on the ground of (specify):
*1 cl. I
I wife's former name be restored (specify):
• e j
j This judgment shall be entered nunc pro tunc as of (date):
i \ f• j X I Jurisdiction is reserved over all other issues and all present orders remain in effect except as provided below.

£ g. Q Q other (specify): On 10/12/94, the Honorable Judge D. Cole made certain
„
findings reflected in the attached Order incorporated herein as though
•
fully set forth. Among the Court's Findings and Orders, the Court, as a
y
result of the bad faith actions of Petitioner, ordered the Petitioner's
o
pleadings as to property only be stricken, and that the matter proceed
by Default as to property issues. Custody and visitation was resolved by
stipulation on 2/9/93. Please, see continuation of Item 3(g).
h. Jurisdiction is reserved to make other orders necessary to carry out this judgment
Date:
4. Number of additional pages attached:

JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

I

I Signature follows last attachment

NOTICE
Please review your will, insurance policies, retirement benefit plans, credit cards, other credit accounts and credit reports, and other
matters you may want to change in view of the dieeoiution or annulment of your marriage, or your legal separation.
A debt or obligation may be assigned to one party as part of the division of property and debts, but if that party does not pay the debt
or obligation, the creditor may be able to collect from the other party.
An earnings assignment will automatically be issued rf child support, family support, or spousal support is ordered.
Form Adopted by Rule 1287
FamHy Code. 112340.2343.2346
JUDGMENT
judiaai council of CaMomia
(Family
Law)
1287 (Rev. January 1.1995)
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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO
CASE No. RFL01543
ATTACHMENT TO JUDGEMENT
CONTINUATION OF ITEM 3(G)
The issue of the status of the Marriage pursuant to a Motion
to Bifurcate was heard and granted on 3/30/95.
A single, all inclusive, Judgement is submitted to the Court
for signature on the defaulted issues, stipulated issues, and
status.

FRIIS vs. FRIIS
JUDGEMENT - Case No. RFL01543
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1

LAW OFFICES OF ATTORNEY

2

4255 MAIN STREET
RIVERSIDE, CALIFORNIA 92501
TELEPHONE (909) 928-1902

3

RICHARD SMOLIN

4
5

ATTORNEY FOR: LINDA FRIIS

6 I
7
8

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

9
Case No. RFL 01543

ROBERT FRIIS
10
11

Petitioner

) DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Respondent

)

VS.

12
LINDA FRIIS
13
14
15
16

The court acquired jurisdiction over the respondent, Linda

17

Friis, on August 18, 1993. The parties were married on January

18 J 30, 1987, and separated on May 17, 1993, a period of 6 years and
19

five months. There is one minor child, Denum Friis, D.O.B.

20

December 13, 1990, born to this union. During the course of the

21

marriage, irremediable and irreconcilable differences have arisen

22

which have caused the total breakdown of the marriage.

23

On February 9, 1994, the parties entered into a stipulation

24

regarding permanent custody and visitation orders concerning the

25

minor child, Denum Friis. Based upon the parties1 stipulation

26

dated 2/9/94, it shall be the Order of the Court, except as

27

modified by the court on 3/30/95, that:

28

"Legal custody of the minor child of the parties, ROBERT

0294

1 I DENUM FRIIS, born 12/13/93, is awarded jointly to the parties.
2 || Mutual consent of both parties shall be required for the major
3 1 decisions relating to the child's health, education and welfare.
4 I Failure to obtain consent may result in contempt action, jail
5 I sentence, or change or loss of custody. Primary physical custody
6 I for the care, custody and control of the minor child to be with
7 I Respondent; however, Petitioner shall have physical care, custody
8 I and control of the minor child as follows:
9 1
10

a). Each month from the second Saturday at 8:00 a.m.
to the third Sunday at 6:00 p.m. commencing February, 1994.

11 1
12

b ) . Christmas

1994,

the

entire

Christmas

school

vacation, commencing at 6:00 p.m. the last day of school before
H

13 I the vacation and ending at 6:00 p.m. the day before school
14 I resumes, and thereafter on alternate years.
15 1

c) • Thanksgiving vacation 1995, from 4:00 p.m. the day

16 I before said vacation to 6:00 p.m. the day before school resumes
17 I and thereafter on alternate years.
18 I

d ) . Summer vacation - 1994. One extra week in June,

19 | July and August, which will be contiguous with regular custody
20 I period to be determined by the parties.
21 I

During the six weeks of school vacation, while custody is

22 I with Respondent, Petitioner will have weekend visitation from
23 I Friday at 4:00 p.m. until Sunday at 6:00 p.m., during the
24 1 midpoint of said period.
25 I

Pick up and delivery will be at the Police Station in

26 I Parowan, Utah, with a 2 hour grace period. If either party
27 I anticipates a delay beyond that "window11 they are required, as

28 I

023^

soon as is practical, to advise the Watch Commander at Parowan
Police Department of said delay and revised estimated time of
arrival.
Neither parent is to use disparaging remarks, nor allow any
other person to use disparaging remarks, about the other parent
in front of the child.
Neither parent is to use corporal punishment on the minor
child.
Each parent should promote and encourage mutual respect and
affection for the other parent. The child should be led to
believe that it is appropriate for him to love and to value both
mother and father".
The above Stipulation and Order shall be modified in the
following respects only: "Pick up time for Petitioner/father's
visitation, shall be 4:00 p.m. There shall be a two hour grace
period for pick up and return of the minor child. Respondent
shall not withhold the child from Petitioner before 6:00 p.m.
In the event Petitioner/father is more than two hours late
at pick up time, he shall then forfeit his visitation for that
particular month.
In the event that Petitioner/father is more than two hours
late in returning the minor child, he shall forfeit the next
monthfs visitation.
The exchange of the minor child shall occur at the Parowan
Police Department. In the event that said Department is closed to
the public at the time of the scheduled exchange, the exchange
shall take place curbside at Respondent's residence.
Marriage of FRIIS
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On July 15, 1993 the court appointed Attorney James M. Steck
2 J as Referee and Special Master for all assets, both community and
3

separate, in the above entitled matter.

4 I
5

Between July

15, 1993 and October

12, 1994, numerous

pretrial Order to Show Cause hearings and conferences were

6 I conducted on all issues then pending in this court. The court
7 I issued many pretrial orders. Ultimately, the court set the matter
8 1 for a full disclosure hearing on September 29, 1994. Pursuant to
9

the request of the Special Master James Steck.

10 I

The court, based upon the evidence submitted, testimony of

11 I the parties and that of Petitionees daughter, Shawna Friis, who
12

was joined as a party, and argument of counsel, the matter was

13

taken under submission.

14

On October 12, 1994, the court issued the following order:

15

"Pursuant to the various and multiple hearings before this

16 I Court, based upon previous Orders of this Court, Judge J Lewis
17

Liesch and Judge Paul M. Bryant, and based upon the Disclosure

18

Hearing of September 29, 1994, in Department "12" of the San

19 I Bernardino Superior Court, it is Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed:
20 I

1.

Shawna Friis, whose address is 6140 Cabernet,

21 I Rancho Cucamonga, California, is hereby Joined in this action.
22 I Ms. Shawna Friis is hereby ordered not to transfer, hypothecate,
23 0 sell, trade, or dispose of certain Cessna airplane, transferred
R

24 | to her by Mr. Robert E. Friis.
25 I

2.

The Court finds that the transfer of the Cessna

26 I airplane, for $1.00

(one dollar) consideration, is, by the

27 I admission of Shawna Friis, a transfer without consideration and,
I Marriaoe of FRIIS
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I
1 J pursuant to previous Court Orders, done for the explicit purpose
2 || of avoiding multiple Court Orders and, as a result, Ms. Shawna
3 1 Friis is hereby Ordered to return said Cessna airplane to the
4 | Jurisdiction of this Court and to deposit said airplane, with the
5 I Marshal of the County of San Bernardino, to be liened sold by the
6 I Marshal of this County or, in a manner designated by this Court
7 J or by law.
8 I

3.

The

Court

finds

that

the

Respondent

has

9 I intentionally and deliberately failed to comply with the Orders
10

of this Court, Judge Paul M. Bryant, and Judge J. Lewis Leisch,

11

in regard to the transfer or sale of community assets, quasi-

12

community assets, or separate assets.

13 I

4.

The Court finds that the actions of Mr. Friis, in

14 I relation to previous Orders of the Court, in relation to the
15 8 Hearing of September 29, 1994, is clearly in bad faith.
16 I

That bad faith is clearly evidenced by the fact

17 1 that the Court, by the Honorable Judge J. Lewis Leisch, Ordered
18 I Mr. Robert E. Friis not to transfer any property, not to
19 I dissipate any community assets, and not to secrete any assets.
20 I

Furthermore, said Order of the Judge J. Lewis

21 8 Leisch was additionally made an Order of the Court by Judge Paul
22 J M. Bryant, who extended that Order to any and all community,
23 I quasi-community, or separate property assets.
24 I

By his own admission, Mr. Robert E. Friis has

25 | dissipated the community, quasi-community, or separate property
26 I assets in the real property, known as to the "Topaz Property11.
27 i Mr. Robert E. Friis, by his own admission, has failed to make
I Marriage of FRIIS
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payment on that property for a considerable period of time and
has allowed said property to be sold as a foreclosure sale. By
his own admission, before the Court, Mr. Robert E. Friis has
indicated that he is in arrears on said property in the sum
between $21,000.00 and $25,000.00.
5.

The

Court

finds

that

this

dissipation

was

deliberate and intentional and was done for the explicit purpose
of defrauding the community and was done in contravention of
Court Orders. Furthermore, the Court finds that this was a
singular part of a plan, by Mr. Robert E. Friis, to dissipate
said community properties.
6.

The Court finds that various assets have been

moved to the State of Arizona, in order to avoid the Jurisdiction
of this Court. By his own admission, in Court on September 29,
1994, Mr. Robert E. Friis has moved several boats to the "Parker
Property", which include a twelve (12) foot homemade boat, a 1992
Jetmate Ski Boat, and other such boats not disclosed by him.
7.

The Court also finds that a Marlin Boat, that Mr#

Robert E. Friis has indicated was taken by Ms. Friis, was in the
possession of Mr. Robert E. Friis for a considerable time past
separation and that boat has been conveniently "stolen" only
recently.
8.

Additionally, pursuant to the sworn testimony of

Mr. Robert E. Friis, certain furniture and furnishings have been
either removed, sole, or secreted by Mr. Robert E. Friis.
9.

Pursuant to the testimony of Mr. Robert E. Friis

and the offer of proof of Ms. Linda Friis1s attorney, a certain

1988 Comfort Motorhome and a certain

1989 Harley

Davidson

Motorcycle, were sold, in contravention of the Court Order and in
a direct contradiction of the prior testimony of Mr. Robert E.
Friis. Pursuant to the offer of proof of Mr. Smolin, the Court
finds that the automobile and motorhome were in possession of Mr.
Robert E. Friis, quite recently, and was not sold fifteen (15)
days after separation.
10.

The Court finds that Mr. Robert E. Friis has

either sold or secreted other automobiles in the Riverside
warehouse of Mr. Haller on Van Buren and Riverside. The Court
Orders

that

Mr.

Robert

E.

Friis

and/or

Mr.

Haller,

if

appropriate, return all such automobiles to the jurisdiction of
this Court.
11.

The Court finds that a certain Campbell Boat and

Trailer has been secreted, within the State of Arizona, at the
"Parker Arizona Property11, in order to avoid the Jurisdiction of
this Court. Mr. Robert E. Friis is Ordered to immediately return
any Campbell Boat and Trailer to this Jurisdiction.
12.

As a result of the bad faith actions of the

Petitioner herein, the Court hereby Orders that the pleadings be
stricken as to Mr. Robert E. Friis and that the matter proceed by
Default. Counsel for Mr. Linda Friis is hereby Ordered to list,
with singularity, any and all items, whether automobiles, boats,
or of a similar nature, and any and all furniture and furnishings
25 | claimed, to be presented to the Court for itfs signature.
Pursuant to that Judgment, the Court has hereby instructed the
attorney for Ms. Linda M. Friis, to prepare a declaration by Ms.
Marriage of FRIIS

0288

Linda M. friis attesting to the community property of that
property.
13.

The Court finds that Mr. Robert Friis has utilized

community property for his own separate property interest, has
dissipated community property as hereinabove described, and has
acted in a manner of exceedingly bad faith with this Court.
Therefore, the Court does hereby Order the sale of all community
property, in the possession of Mr. Robert E. Friis, or under his
domain and control and the return of any and all property to Ms.
Linda M. Friis, as dictated in the Judgment.
14.

The Marshall, for the County of San Bernardino, is

hereby appointed, as far as able, under the laws of the State of
California, to sell any and all property under this Order or the
following Judgment.
15.

Additionally,

pursuant

to

the

relevant

Code

Sections, the Court does hereby find that the actions of Mr.
Robert E. Friis are a direct breach of his fiduciary relationship
to the community, his dissipation of community assets under his
control, are a result of bad faith actions, pursuant to Family
Code paragraph 271 and Code of Civil Procedure paragraph 128.5
and that, punitive damages, in the amount of fifty percent (50%)
of all assets so ascertained, shall be charged against Mr. Robert
E. Friis.
16.

The Court makes the finding, to and for any Courts

of competent Jurisdiction, that this action by the Court, is
punitive in nature, and is a result of fraud, bad faith, breach
of fiduciary relationship and many other tortious acts committed

026*7
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by Mr. Robert E. Friis.
17.

The Court further finds that other individuals,

not a party to this action from the onset, have acted in
conspiracy with Mr. Robert E. Friis in order to avoid the
Jurisdiction of this Court, to defraud the Court, and to act in
bad faith.
As a result, the Court retains Jurisdiction over
all assets of this marriage, all quasi-community assets, and all
separate property assets of Mr. Robert E. Friis. As a result, any
individuals who are found to have conspired with Mr. Robert E.
Friis, for the actions hereinabove described, shall, by Ex-Parte
Motion, be deemed joined to this action in order to explain any
such conspiracies."
On 3/30/95, the matter came on calendar regularly upon
Respondent's Notice of Motion to amend her Response, bifurcate
the issue of status, correct a clerical error in the Order of
October 12, 1994, and clarification of item 15, page 4, of the
October 12, 1994 Order.
The Court hereby grants Respondent's request to amend her
Response, to specify with particularity the separate property
assets and community assets of the parties. The Court hereby
grants Respondent's request to bifurcate on the issue of status
and status was adjudicated. The Court, pursuant to Respondent's
request to correct a clerical error, grants the relief prayed for
and on page 2, item 3, line 7 and deletes the word "Respondent"
and inserts the word "Petitioner, Robert E. Friis".
The Court orders that Special Master James Steck, clarify
Marriage of FRIIS
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1 I page 4, item 15, lines 27 and 28.
2 I

Upon

inquiry

of

Special Mater James

Steck,

regarding

3 I clarification of page 4, item 15, lines 27 and 28, "...punitive
4 | damage in the amount of fifty percent (50%) of all assets so
5 I ascertained, shall be charged against Mr. Robert Friis shall
6 1 include all community and separate property of Mr. Friis in
7 I calculating punitive damages based upon Respondent's amended
8 I Response and Schedule of Assets and Debts filed on 3/30/94.
9 I

Specifically, the Respondent shall be awarded the following

10 I items based upon the Court's Findings and Order of October 12,
11 I 1994 and March 30, 1995:
12 1
I
•13 I
A
14 I
I
15 I
I
16 I
U
17 I
18 |
I
19 I
|
20 I
I
21 |
J
22 |
I
23 I
I
24 I
I
25 I
|
26 I
I
27 |
J
28 I

1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

The community equity, at the time of
separation, in the family residence located
at 5282 Topaz Street, Alta Loma, CA.
(Asset value: $230,000.00 Encumbrance: $198,000.00)
$32,000.00
221 Stardust Lane, Parker, AA,
Parcel #2264701-014
$85,000.00
Parcel # 0334343020000, Lake Arrowhead, CA $90,000.00
Parcel # 0333545010000, Lake Arrowhead, CA $30,000.00
1976 Jaguar
$2,000.00
1984 Chevrolet Corvette
$5,200.00
1987 BMW 325i
$4,325.00
1976 Ford Cobra (Lie. Plate #C0BRA EP)
$4,000.00
1967 Chevrolet Chevelle
$3,500.00
1987 Mazdza Truck
$3,135.00
1983 Chevrolet S-10 Truck
$2,400.00
1989 Ford Escort
$3,000.00
1988 Dodge Omni
$2,200.00
1985 Buick Park Avenue
$2,110.00
1988 Jeep Cherokee Wagon
$4,900.00
1986 Ford Truck
$4,400.00
1989 Toyota Truck
$3,900.00
1987 Dodge Truck
$1,475.00
1988 Ford Taurus
$3,500.00
1979 Ford Bronco
$2,300.00
1986 Honda Motorcycle
$490.00
1984 Ford Mustang Convertible
$3,500.00
1977 Chevrolet Montecarlo
$100.00
1986 Honda Prelude
$460.00
1988 Comfort Motorhome
Lie. Plate # 2WFG968
(Vehicle ID #1GBKP37W8J3323930)
$25,000.00
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26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

1988 Marlin Mercruiser (Ocean Boat)
OB849229
(Vehicle ID #EKWCE118A888)
1988 Lomac Boat Trailer
Lie. Plate #U136192
(Vehicle ID# 427TB25B4JX000507)
1989 Harley Davidson Motorcycle
Lie. Plate #12C5266
(Vehicle ID #1HD1BLL32KY018623)
1969 Crestline Boat and Trailer
1989 Campbell Boat and Trailer
Two (2) Kawasakii Jetskis with trailer
Twelve (12) Foot Runabout Boat with trailer
Catameran Boat and trailer
Dico Double Deck Dune Buggy trailer
Lie. Plate #2FT4437
(Vehicle ID #10DBB19D4GA002439)
Sandrail, four seater
Rock Dune Buggy
Honda ATV Three Wheeler
1974 Chevrolet Suburban
Lie. Plate #12C5266
(Vehicle ID #CCZ264F102616)
Yamaha ATV Four Wheeler
Honda ATV, Three Wheeler
1989 Honda Elite Motorcycle
1967 Honda 90 Moped
Airplane, Cessna 182 #N8601T
Parcel # 100633130-A068
1984 Chevrolet Station Wagon
Two (2) 18-speed mountain bikes
10-speed bike
Tricycle
Antique Pool Table
Complete set pure ivory pool balls
Standard set pool balls
Tadd Pool Que
Seven standard pool gues
Ocean scene oil painting
Farm scene oil painting
Antique sewing machine with solid oak case
Solid oak kitchen table
Six oak kitchen chairs
Microwave oven
Microwave oven (river)
6E Refrigerator
GE Refrigerator (river)
Six Persian Rugs
Complete kitchen furnishings (silverware,
pots, pans, dishes, etc.)
Complete kitchen furnishings (river)
Complete kitchen furnishings (motorhome)
48" Mitsubishi TV
30M Magnavox color TV (river)
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$25,000.00
$5,000.00
$15,000.00
$800.00
$25,000.00
$3,000.00
$2,500.00
$1,500.00
$1,500.00
$7,500.00
$2,000.00
$1,100.00
$4,000.00
$1,500.00
$1,200.00
$1,200.00
$300.00
$40,000.00
$500.00
$600.00
$100.00
$20.00
$5,000.00
$3,000.00
$50.00
$1,500.00
$100.00
$300.00
$200.00
$1,500.00
$1,500.00
$600.00
$150.00
$150.00
$500.00
$500.00
$2,500.00
$750.00
$750.00
$500.00
$2,500.00
$500.00
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68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

10 I
11

II

84.
85.

TWO 24" RCA TVs
$300.00
Four Ritan rocker swivel chairs
$200.00
Two oak and glass tables
$200.00
Couch and love seat
$200.00
Solid Oak desk and chair
$800.00
IBM compatible computer and laser printer
$1,500.00
Solid Oak file cabinet
$400.00
Maytag washing machine
$250.00
Maytag washing machine (river)
$250.00
Maytag gas drier
$200.00
Maytag gas drier
$200.00
Six porcelain plate collection
$250.00
Nine brass lamps (three hanging, six table)
$500.00
Bunk bed, twin top and double bottom
$400.00
Eight piece solid oak bedroom w/California
king mattress
$3,850.00
Five piece oak and brass bedroom set
w/double box spring and mattress
$2,000.00
Queen size solid wood bedroom set (river)
$500.00
Five piece solid wood bedroom set
w/California king box spring and mattress
$1,200.00
All Linda's personal items
(wardrobe, jewelry, etc.)
$3,000.00
One two man handwoven hammock
$600.00
Five piece hand made willow outdoor furniture $750.00
Outdoor patio table and chair
$200.00
Approx. 1220 Feet Christmas lights and
accompanying extension cord
$850.00
Upright toy chest, hand painted, with the
name Denim inscribed
$150.00
Antiques oak child's desk w/porcelain handles
and chair
$250.00
Dirt Devil vacuum cleaner
$50.00
Hoover vacuum cleaner (river)
$50.00
Bissel carpet shampooer
$75.00
Trampoline
$300.00
Antique porcelain doll w/peach silk gown
$1,800.00
Two Samsung VCRs
$200.00
One Samsung VCR (river)
$100.00
Solid wood dining room table with chairs
$400.00
Couch and love seat set (river)
$300.00
Blender, hand mixer, coffee maker, food
processor, and toaster
$150.00
Double stack Craftsman tool chest and
tools
$1,500.00
Double stack Craftsman tool chest and
tools ($1,500.00)
$1,500.00
Automobile hydraulic floor jack
$50.00
Four motorcycle helmets
$100.00
Minolta camera w/two lenses
$750.00
Camcorder and tripod
$500.00
Two stainless steel swords (Linda's family
heirloom)
$500.00
Shovel, rake and hoe
$25.00

86.
12 |
I
87.
13 I
88.
I
89.
14 I
86.
I
15 I
87.
I
16 I
88.
I
17 I
89.
J
90.
18 I
91.
I
92.
19 I
93.
I
94.
20 I
95.
I
96.
21 J
97.
I
98.
22 I
I
99.
23 I
I
100.
24 I
I
101.
25 |
102.
I
103.
26 I
104.
I
105.
27 I
I
106.
28 1
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107. Shovel, rake and hoe (river)
$25.00
108. Lawn mower
$75.00
109. Gas weed eater
$65.00
110. Electric weed eater (river)
$40.00
ill. Ten garden hoses
$100.00
112. Linens, blankets and bedspreads, six bedrooms $600.00
113. Towels to furnish four bathrooms (two homes)
$400.00
114. Twelve life preserver/jackets and ski ropes
$250.00
115. Miscellaneous home decor items (two homes)
$1,000.00
116. Reimbursement of Attorney fees paid to the
Law Office of Ferrazzo and Ferrazzo
$87,000.00
117. Monetary Judgement in favor of Robert Friis,
in Friis vs. Vides (amount unknown at this
time. Will supplement when ascertained)
UNKNOWN

8
TOTAL * $597,670.00 + item 117 above, Amount of Monetary
9
Judgement.
10
The respondent, Linda Friis, shall be awarded, as
11
punitive damages, the sum of $298,835.00 + 50% of the
12

Monetary Judgement reflected in item 117 above.

13
The Court shall reserve jurisdiction over the issues of
14
Respondents request for attorney fees for Attorney Richard
15
Smolin, counsel for Respondent; Attorney Michael Darlington,
16
counsel for the minor child; fees for the appointed Special
17
Master, Attorney James Steck and fees for the appointed real
18

estate agent, Sandy Schaeffer, until Order of the Court.

19
Due to the Petitioner's fraudulent conduct in disposing
20
of Community, Quasi-Community and Separate Property, the
21
Court reserves jurisdiction over all omitted or undisclosed
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

assets of the parties including, but not limited to, all
vehicles, motorvehicles, boats, trailers and motorcycles
listed, which are not specifically identified by VIN number
and or License Plate Number, due to Respondent's lack of
access to said information. Specifically, the Court shall
retain Jurisdiction over these assets to clarify or amend
Marriage of FRIIS
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this Judgement upon ascertainment of any and/or all VIN
numbers and/or license plate numbers for those vehicles
listed

in

this

Judgement

without

such

identifying

information.
The respondent is granted leave of the Court, upon Exparte application, to amend or clarify this Judgement in
relation to these vehicles, motorvehicles, boats, trailers
and motorcycles.
Upon location and/or recovery of any and/or all of the
items awarded to Respondent in this matter, the Court
reserves jurisdiction to make any necessary and proper
orders regarding the method and manner that said items are
to be disposed of, sold, or otherwise liquidated and/or
reduced to possession by Respondent, Linda Friis.
Respondent shall be granted leave of Court, upon Ex*
parte application, to secure any and/or all necessary and
proper orders concerning the method and manner that said
items are to be disposed and/or reduced to possession by
Respondent upon location and/^: recovery.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

/ /

/ ^ /

jyOGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
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